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ABSTRACT 
As courts attempt to develop Fourth Amendment doctrine to address the threats to privacy created by digital 
surveillance technologies, a valuable doctrinal resource has been largely neglected: the law governing the seizure of 
persons.  Just as courts today struggle with the specter of mass search using digital technologies, courts in the 
1960s were confronted with the problem of mass seizure through the growing use of stop-and-frisk by police 
departments.  The responses to mass seizure developed by the Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 592 U.S. 1 
(1968), and its progeny provide lessons for courts today considering how to respond to the risks of digital mass 
search.  By adopting the “mosaic theory,” the Supreme Court has already begun to apply to digital search a form 
of aggregative reasoning that has long been used to define the seizure of persons. 
The analogy between seizure doctrine and search doctrine also sheds light on the significance of the Supreme 
Court’s recent, landmark decision in Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018), which responded 
to the declining cost of digital surveillance in a way that resembles Terry’s response to the rising use of stop-and-
frisk in the 1960s.  Carpenter opens the door for courts to develop a two-tiered doctrinal scheme for digital 
search, with less invasive searches requiring reasonable suspicion and more invasive searches requiring probable 
cause.  Among other virtues, such an approach would provide a doctrinal foothold for subjecting the bulk collection 
of metadata and other digital mass surveillance programs to Fourth Amendment review. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This Article offers a proposal for how courts might finally subject digital 
mass surveillance by state actors to judicial scrutiny under the Fourth 
Amendment.  Along the way, the Article addresses a number of related 
topics, including the bureaucratization of American policing; the history of 
programmatic stop-and-frisk before Terry v. Ohio;1 and how courts adjust 
constitutional doctrine to respond to increases in the frequency of a 
constitutionally problematic activity, even when the frequency of the activity 
is, strictly speaking, legally irrelevant.  But the ultimate aim of the Article is 
to provide a roadmap for arriving at reasonable constitutional restrictions on 
digital mass surveillance that are grounded as much as possible in existing 
Fourth Amendment doctrine. 
As digital privacy scholars and activists have long argued,2 digital mass 
surveillance—the government’s use of digital technologies to surveil large 
numbers of people in the United States who have not been individually 
targeted for surveillance—poses a historically unprecedented threat to the 
privacy values that the Fourth Amendment is supposed to protect.3  Yet the 
Fourth Amendment, which remains “the primary form of regulation of 
government information gathering” in the United States,4 currently provides 
no protection against the vast majority of existing and possible forms of 
digital mass surveillance.5 
A narrow majority of the Supreme Court recently acknowledged the 
problem in a landmark decision, Carpenter v. United States,6 which removed a 
doctrinal obstacle to Fourth Amendment review of certain particularly 
serious intrusions of privacy using digital technology.7  But even in the wake 
of Carpenter, it remains unclear how, precisely, it might be possible to subject 
digital mass surveillance to judicial scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment 
when the surveillance in question, viewed in isolation, represents a relatively 
minor intrusion of privacy. 
 
 1 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 2 See infra note 22. 
 3 See generally infra Part I. 
 4 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE: THE FALSE TRADEOFF BETWEEN PRIVACY AND 
SECURITY 12 (2011). 
 5 See infra Part I. 
 6 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018). 
 7 See infra Part III.A. 
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What is the shortest, most plausible route from existing Fourth 
Amendment case law to the reasonable constitutional regulation of digital 
mass surveillance? 
The novelty of this Article’s proposal is that it suggests Fourth 
Amendment doctrine already contains the resources necessary to address 
many of the threats to privacy created by government surveillance using 
digital technologies.  These resources have been largely overlooked, however, 
because they appear in the underlying reasoning of Fourth Amendment 
seizure doctrine, while digital surveillance is largely a matter of Fourth 
Amendment search doctrine.  In particular, once the Supreme Court’s 
development of Fourth Amendment doctrine to govern stop-and-frisk in 
Terry is understood as a response to the rising threat of mass seizure, it 
becomes possible to see that the Fourth Amendment has encountered threats 
from the mechanistic proliferation of problematic but constitutionally 
unregulated government acts in the past, and has attempted to address them 
in ways that provide lessons for the current moment. 
The Article’s proposal for the Fourth Amendment regulation of digital 
mass surveillance has two parts.  First, courts should adopt a two-tiered 
approach to digital search that is analogous to the two-tiered approach to the 
seizure of persons under Terry and its progeny.  Just as Terry holds that an 
arrest must be supported by probable cause, while a temporary detention—
a Terry stop—need only be supported by reasonable suspicion that the seized 
person is engaged in criminal activity, so courts should hold that if an act of 
digital surveillance is sufficiently intrusive of an individual’s privacy, the 
government must obtain a warrant backed by probable cause, but lesser 
intrusions should require only reasonable suspicion.8 
Second, courts should sometimes engage in programmatic review of digital 
mass surveillance programs under the Fourth Amendment, rather than 
reviewing in isolation the individual acts of surveillance that constitute a 
program.  Again, the proposal rests on an analogy to doctrine governing the 
seizure of persons, and in particular Illinois v. Lidster,9 a 2004 Supreme Court 
case upholding the constitutionality of the brief, suspicionless seizure of 
drivers at a highway checkpoint.10 
 
 8 See infra Part III.B. 
 9 540 U.S. 419 (2004). 
 10 See infra Part III.C. 
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The need for both parts of the doctrinal solution can be understood by 
considering a hypothetical case involving a Fourth Amendment challenge to 
a digital mass surveillance program.  Imagine, for example, that there is a 
surveillance program focused on preventing domestic terrorism that collects 
intuitively private information—say, web browsing histories, or location data 
from a smartphone app, or phone call records—about a relatively large 
number of Americans that the government has no reason to suspect of 
involvement in terrorism or any other crime.  Imagine that some of the 
affected Americans learn that the government collected their information 
and file a lawsuit alleging that the surveillance program is unconstitutional 
under the Fourth Amendment. 
Next, assume that the court believes the surveillance program’s benefits 
to public safety outweigh its harms to Americans’ privacy.11  The court does 
not want to order the termination of the program, and is highly unlikely to 
do so.  Although the surveillance program is focused on terrorism rather than 
crime in general, assume further that in the course of ordinary criminal 
investigations, the police frequently collect the same type of information that 
is at issue in our case—although, when domestic law enforcement collects 
the information, it does so through narrow requests focused on specific 
individuals suspected of criminal activity.  Assume also that law enforcement 
representatives can persuasively argue that the police need the ability to 
collect this information without probable cause, early in an investigation, in 
order to develop probable cause and effectively enforce criminal laws against 
serious crimes such as hacking, white-collar financial crime, or child 
pornography.12 
 
 11 Some readers might object on principle that this could never be the case, and that safety interests 
could never justify the bulk collection of intuitively private digital data from Americans.  For the 
purposes of this Article, however, it is not necessary to settle this normative issue.  See infra note 165. 
 12 Evan Caminker observes: 
Many . . . types of third-party records (especially financial, credit card purchases, internet 
protocol addresses, and phone/text noncontent metadata) are routinely relied upon in 
early-stage investigations.  And certain types of crimes would largely defy successful 
prosecution without early access to such third-party records.  Obvious examples include 
white-collar financial crimes, identity theft, “[m]alicious hacking, possession of child 
pornography, laundering money through gambling websites, and insider trading,” which 
among other crimes “leave very few clues in the physical world.”  And proactive efforts to 
identify and thwart potential acts of terrorism require lots of background location and 
movement data from which computer algorithms can predict conventional behavior in 
order to discern unconventional and perhaps threatening aberrations. 
  Evan Caminker, Location Tracking and Digital Data: Can Carpenter Build a Stable Privacy Doctrine?,  12 
S. CT. REV. 411, 465–66 (2018) (citations omitted); see also SUSAN LANDAU, LISTENING IN: 
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Assume, finally, that the court also believes that allowing the government 
to collect this category of intuitively private information without any Fourth 
Amendment restriction whatsoever would gravely undermine Americans’ 
constitutional privacy interests.  The court wants to issue a ruling that is 
protective of privacy. 
How can the court reconcile these tensions between national security, law 
enforcement, and privacy?  In particular, how can it do so while adhering as 
closely as possible to existing Fourth Amendment doctrine? 
It would be unsatisfactory for the court to conclude that Americans do 
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the type of information at 
issue in the case, despite its intuitively very private nature.  This is the status 
quo approach, and it remains the most likely outcome based on existing 
Fourth Amendment case law.  The outcome preserves the surveillance 
program, but at the cost of allowing the government to collect, with no 
Fourth Amendment restrictions, an unlimited quantity of this private 
information about an unlimited number of Americans, into perpetuity, and 
to do whatever it wishes with this information once it has been collected.  The 
status quo approach protects national security and law enforcement, but fails 
to protect privacy. 
Another unsatisfactory outcome would be for the court to adopt only the 
first part of the doctrinal solution above.  The court could take a two-tiered 
approach to digital search and conclude that the government only requires 
reasonable suspicion to collect from Americans the type of information 
collected by the surveillance program.  By requiring a reasonable evidentiary 
basis for collection, but stopping short of requiring a warrant supported by 
probable cause, this approach could reconcile the needs of ordinary law 
enforcement with Americans’ interest in privacy.  But it would leave the 
terrorism-focused surveillance program unconstitutional, because the 
government lacks even reasonable suspicion that the information collected 
from each of the affected Americans will reveal evidence of a crime. 
Yet another unsatisfactory outcome would be for the court to engage in 
programmatic review of the surveillance program, but maintain the one-
tiered, current approach to Fourth Amendment search, according to which 
searches almost always require a warrant backed by probable cause.  That 
is, the court could conclude that the Fourth Amendment requires probable 
 
CYBERSECURITY IN AN INSECURE AGE 117–51 (2017) (describing the use of digital data in criminal 
investigations including hacking, terrorism, and child pornography). 
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cause to collect from Americans the type of private information collected by 
the surveillance program.  The court could recognize that the government 
cannot establish it has probable cause to justify the searches at issue in the 
plaintiffs’ lawsuit.  But the court could nevertheless uphold the program by 
concluding that when the program is viewed as a whole, a balancing of the 
constitutionally relevant considerations leads to the conclusion that the 
program is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.  In this scenario, the 
court would be able to preserve the surveillance program and the privacy of 
most Americans—but would sacrifice the ability of domestic law 
enforcement to effectively enforce the criminal law. 
Only by adopting both the two-tiered approach to digital search and the 
programmatic review of digital mass surveillance programs can the court 
reconcile the competing interests in national security, law enforcement, and 
privacy described above—while maintaining a grounding in existing Fourth 
Amendment doctrine, even if the doctrine in question is the Fourth 
Amendment law of seizure rather than of search. 
Part I presents in greater detail the threats to privacy created by digital 
mass surveillance, and the obstacles to addressing those threats under existing 
Fourth Amendment case law.  Part II begins the development of the 
structural analogy between seizure doctrine and search doctrine by 
presenting Terry v. Ohio as a response to the threat of mass seizure.  Part III.A 
extends the analogy between seizure and search doctrine by arguing that 
Carpenter bears significant similarities to Terry.  Part III.B argues that Carpenter 
opens the door to the development of a two-tiered doctrinal scheme for 
digital search, with less invasive searches requiring reasonable suspicion and 
more invasive searches requiring a warrant based on probable cause.  
It is worth emphasizing at the outset that even if one believes Terry was a 
mistake, and that the Fourth Amendment should be understood to require 
probable cause for any seizure of a person, one should still embrace the two-
tiered approach in the context of digital search.  The only realistic alternative 
to a Terry-like, two-tiered approach to digital search is the status quo, in 
which the vast majority of digital surveillance by the state remains 
ungoverned by any constitutional restrictions.  
Turning more specifically to the problems of digital mass surveillance, 
Part III.C addresses how Fourth Amendment doctrine can and should 
respond not only to the threats created by digital surveillance of individual 
criminal suspects, but to digital surveillance of larger numbers of people, 
communities, or the public as a whole.  Once again, Fourth Amendment 
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seizure doctrine, and in particular Lidster, can provide a useful model.  
Finally, Part IV notes that the recent “mosaic theory” cases dealing with 
digital search simply apply to search the same aggregative form of reasoning 
that courts have long applied in the context of the seizure of persons.  The 
mosaic theory cases represent a promising step toward the greater 
reconciliation of search and seizure doctrine that this Article recommends. 
The Conclusion emphasizes the role that judicial enforcement of the 
Fourth Amendment can continue to play in protecting privacy from digital 
intrusion by the government, even as many of the most serious digital threats 
to privacy do not involve government actors and thus fall outside the reach 
of the Fourth Amendment.  The Conclusion also notes the overlap between 
the Fourth Amendment concerns of this Article and the Fourteenth 
Amendment equal protection concerns that will often be raised by programs 
of digital mass surveillance. 
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN THE AGE OF DIGITAL REPRODUCTION 
The potential reach of state power has been transformed in recent years 
by developments in digital technology, from the arrival of email and web 
browsing in mainstream use a little over two decades ago, to the increasingly 
prominent role of smartphones and social media in everyday life over the last 
decade, to the rising significance of big data, artificial intelligence, and the 
“Internet of Things” in smart homes, vehicles, and cities today.13  The 
proliferation of digital sensors and digital records in our daily lives has arrived 
so suddenly that constitutional doctrine has hardly begun to recognize the 
seriousness of the change.  In particular, the Fourth Amendment has not yet 
come to terms with the government’s historically unprecedented ability to 
conduct digital surveillance on a mass scale. 
States and other powerful institutions have always had an appetite for 
legible, actionable knowledge about what they seek to control—whether 
their objects of concern are forests, markets, or the human populations of 
 
 13 For an accessible survey of the increasingly voluminous data produced in everyday life, and its 
relation to government and commercial surveillance, see BRUCE SCHNEIER, DATA AND GOLIATH: 
THE HIDDEN BATTLES TO COLLECT YOUR DATA AND CONTROL YOUR WORLD 13–87 (2015).  
The distinguishing feature of digital data is the reduction of information to binary digits (“bits”).  
See generally C.E. Shannon, A Mathematical Theory of Communication, 27 BELL SYS. TECH. J. 379 (1948). 
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cities.14  At the same time, this appetite has always been checked by 
technological and other material barriers that have effectively limited what 
even the most voracious and unconstrained institution might “see” and 
“know.”  Even Jeremy Bentham’s imagined “panopticon” was premised on 
the notion that the prison could not afford enough watchmen to observe all 
the inmates individually.15  So long as surveillance relied on paper records 
and the machinery of the flesh—the eyes and ears of watchmen and 
functionaries, the whispers of informants—the relatively high cost of human 
labor and the difficulty of storing and using collected information placed 
severe limits on the state’s ability to monitor the public as a whole.  The Stasi 
could not afford to place microphones in every home in East Germany, much 
less listen to and make use of the resulting intelligence.16 
But the combination of inexpensive technologies for collecting, 
transmitting, storing, and analyzing digital data with the increasing public 
use of digital technologies—for communication, shopping, entertainment, 
and virtually every other facet of contemporary life—has created 
unprecedented opportunities for mass surveillance.  It is technologically 
feasible for the state to simultaneously and continuously monitor the lives of 
the public as a whole, or of entire subsets of the public that the state finds 
deserving of interest, in ways that were not practical only a generation ago.  
The dystopian and discriminatory potential of digital mass surveillance is 
already being realized in some parts of the world—perhaps most notoriously 
in Xinjiang, a majority-Muslim region of northwestern China where party 
leaders have begun to develop the world’s first digital prison state, alongside 
 
 14 See JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: HOW CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IMPROVE THE HUMAN 
CONDITION HAVE FAILED 2–5, 11–22 (1998) (discussing how powerful institutions impose order 
in part by creating “legibility” through simplification and using scientific forestry as an illustration). 
 15 See Jerome E. Dobson & Peter F. Fisher, The Panopticon’s Changing Geography, 97 GEOGRAPHICAL 
REV. 307, 312–13 (2007) (describing cost reduction by the panopticon); Andrew B. Talai, 
Comment, Drones and Jones: The Fourth Amendment and Police Discretion in the Digital Age, 102 CALIF. L. 
REV. 729, 775 (2014) (describing the structure of the panopticon and its reception by various 
philosophers). 
 16 The Ministry for State Security of the German Democratic Republic (the “Stasi”) was “[p]erhaps 
the most effective organization to engage in mass surveillance for social control in history.”  
TIMOTHY H. EDGAR, BEYOND SNOWDEN: PRIVACY, MASS SURVEILLANCE, AND THE STRUGGLE 
TO REFORM THE NSA 8 (2017).  This estimation is probably no longer true in light of the mass 
surveillance in Xinjiang, China.  See Chris Buckley et al., How China Turned a City into a Prison, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 4, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/04/04/world/asia/xinjiang-
china-surveillance-prison.html. 
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a more traditional archipelago of totalitarian concentration camps.17  In 
more liberal states, the uses of digital mass surveillance have been less 
intrusive.  But the appetite of even relatively liberal governments for 
knowledge about those within their jurisdictions remains strong, as seen, for 
example, in the National Security Agency’s (“NSA”) bulk collection of 
Americans’ digital data,18 or the Los Angeles Police Department’s use of 
digital surveillance and data-mining software to identify likely criminals 
before their criminal acts have occurred.19 
In sum, digital technologies and the public’s use of them have created an 
unprecedented threat to the private sphere that, on many accounts, rests at 
the core of liberalism.20  What has been the response of the Constitution, and 
particularly the Fourth Amendment? 
The general claim that Fourth Amendment search doctrine requires 
reform in order to address the novel threats of the digital age will be familiar 
to anyone who has followed the scholarship on digital privacy and the Fourth 
 
 17 See Buckley et al., supra note 16. 
 18 The reformed version of one of the NSA’s bulk collection programs may recently have ended, but 
others remain in place.  See Charlie Savage, Disputed N.S.A. Phone Program Is Shut Down, Aide Says, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2019), https://nyti.ms/2Vy3gDW; Zack Whittaker, NSA Says Warrantless 
Searches of Americans’ Data Rose in 2018, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 30, 2019), https://techcrunch.com/
2019/04/30/nsa-surveillance-spike/ (summarizing intelligence community’s annual transparency 
report).  According to Edward Snowden, at least, not all of the NSA’s use of Americans’ data has 
been incidental to foreign surveillance.  See, e.g., Glenn Greenwald, XKeyscore: NSA Tool Collects ‘Nearly 
Everything a User Does on the Internet’, GUARDIAN (July 31, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2013/jul/31/nsa-top-secret-program-online-data (describing an NSA tool that can target 
American citizens for extensive electronic surveillance without a warrant). 
 19 Peter Waldman et al., Palantir Knows Everything About You, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 19, 
2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2018-palantir-peter-thiel/. 
 20 See STEVEN LUKES, INDIVIDUALISM 61–62 (1973); JUDITH N. SHKLAR, The Liberalism of Fear, in 
POLITICAL THOUGHT AND POLITICAL THINKERS 3, 6 (Stanley Hoffmann ed., 1998) (defining 
liberalism as committed to securing “the political conditions that are necessary for the exercise of 
personal freedom,” and noting that Shklar’s “liberalism of fear” “must reject only those political 
doctrines that do not recognize any difference between the spheres of the personal and the public”).  
The philosopher Charles Taylor suggests the stakes of current constitutional debates over privacy 
and digital surveillance when he notes that without “the private domain” serving as a kind of anti-
structure opposing the structure of our increasingly disciplined and comprehensively ordered world, 
“life in modern society would be unliveable.”  CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE 52 (2007) 
(drawing on the anthropologist Victor Turner’s discussion of structure and anti-structure in human 
societies to suggest that “[t]he public/private distinction, and the wide area of negative freedom, is 
the equivalent zone” in liberal, pluralist societies to the vital zones of anti-structure in earlier 
societies, such as medieval European carnivals and other “festivals of reversal”). 
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Amendment in the last two decades.21  The ultimate focus of this Article is 
one aspect of digital surveillance that has not always been at the center of 
conversations about the Fourth Amendment law of digital search, perhaps in 
part because it is rarely the subject of Fourth Amendment case law: the 
failures of existing Fourth Amendment search doctrine to protect against 
digital mass surveillance.22  
Current Fourth Amendment case law does more than fail to provide 
adequate constitutional restrictions on governmental collection of digital 
 
 21 See, e.g., Laura K. Donohue, The Fourth Amendment in a Digital World, 71 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 
553, 556 (2017); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The “Smart” Fourth Amendment, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 
547, 574 (2017) (“[B]lind application of non-digital precedent to a digital problem did not offer 
much Fourth Amendment protection.”); David Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative 
Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 62, 67 (2013); Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment in a World Without Privacy, 
81 MISS. L.J. 1309, 1311 (2012); Christopher Slobogin, Panvasive Surveillance, Political Process Theory, 
and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 102 GEO. L.J. 1721, 1723 (2014) (noting that current Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence “has nothing to say about . . . surveillance even when it takes place in 
the absence of any suspicion about the people targeted”)); Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the 
Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1084 (2002).  An earlier wave of 
privacy concerns regarding computerized records and “data banks” arrived in the mid-1960s to 
1970s.  See generally SARAH E. IGO, THE KNOWN CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF PRIVACY IN MODERN 
AMERICA 221–63 (2018); ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 3 (1967).  
 22 There are, of course, many exceptions, including the works of Christopher Slobogin.  See, e.g., 
Christopher Slobogin, Policing, Databases, and Surveillance, in 2 REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE 209–
32 (Erik Luna ed., 2017); Christopher Slobogin, Policing as Administration, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 91, 
122 (2016); Slobogin, supra note 21; Christopher Slobogin, Government Dragnets, 73 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 107, 108 (2010); Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment, 75 
U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 321 (2008).  There is also a voluminous scholarship on the bulk collection of 
digital communications metadata.  See, e.g., Laura K. Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection: Statutory and 
Constitutional Considerations, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 757 (2014).   But in many cases, the 
scholarship on Fourth Amendment digital search doctrine has tended to mirror Fourth 
Amendment case law by focusing on surveillance of targeted individuals or small groups.  See, e.g., 
ORIN S. KERR, Implementing Carpenter, in THE DIGITAL FOURTH AMENDMENT 50 (forthcoming).  
One reason that digital mass surveillance appears so rarely in Fourth Amendment case law may be 
that the subjects of such surveillance often do not know they are being surveilled.  In addition, even 
when potential litigants suspect they are being surveilled, they often lack sufficient evidence to 
establish standing.  See infra note 26 (describing an instance where plaintiffs lacked standing because 
their theory was “too speculative”).  Another reason may be that state actors have deliberately 
concealed the role of digital mass surveillance in the collection of evidence used in criminal cases.  
See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DARK SIDE: SECRET ORIGINS OF EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL 
CASES (2018), available at https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/01/09/dark-side/secret-origins-
evidence-us-criminal-cases (describing the practice of “parallel construction,” where “an official 
who wishes to keep an investigative activity hidden from courts and defendants—and ultimately 
from the public—can simply go through the motions of re-discovering evidence in some other 
way”); Charlie Savage, D.E.A. Secretly Collected Bulk Records of Money-Counter Purchases, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 30, 2019), https://nyti.ms/2UiUigP. 
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data about individuals who are under investigation—as scholars have long 
argued and the Court itself has begun to recognize.23  The existing case law 
also fails to protect members of the public who are not under investigation, 
but whose privacy may be invaded in less obvious ways by large-scale, 
relatively indiscriminate surveillance programs that rely on digital 
technologies, such as programs for the bulk collection of communications 
metadata.24  It is especially unclear, based on the existing case law, how 
Fourth Amendment search doctrine could protect members of the public 
from forms of digital surveillance that might seem relatively uninvasive when 
viewed in isolation—at a single moment, in a single place, with regard to a 
single individual—but that might threaten core privacy interests if allowed to 
proliferate across whole populations without any constitutional check.  
The trouble results in part from the fact that in any context in which 
Fourth Amendment doctrine holds that digital data is not protected by a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, it also holds that the Fourth Amendment 
places no restriction on the government collection of that data regarding an 
unlimited number of individuals.  As the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
(“FISC”) stated in one of its decisions approving the constitutionality of the 
NSA’s warrantless collection of Americans’ phone call metadata: “where one 
individual does not have a Fourth Amendment interest, grouping together a 
large number of similarly-situated individuals cannot result in a Fourth 
Amendment interest springing into existence ex nihilo.”25  The implications of 
 
 23 See supra note 21; infra Part III.A. 
 24 See generally Donohue, supra note 22, at 863–97.  It is because digital mass surveillance tends to be 
indiscriminate that some writers have used the term “dragnet” to refer to it.  See, e.g., JULIA ANGWIN, 
DRAGNET NATION: A QUEST FOR PRIVACY, SECURITY, AND FREEDOM IN A WORLD OF 
RELENTLESS SURVEILLANCE 3 (2014) (“We are living in a Dragnet Nation—a world of 
indiscriminate tracking where institutions are stockpiling data about individuals at an 
unprecedented pace.”); Slobogin, Government Dragnets, supra note 22, at 210–11. 
 25 In re F.B.I., No. BR 13-109, 2013 WL 5741573, at *2 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013).  The metadata 
collected in In re F.B.I. was ostensibly collected pursuant to section 215 of the USA Patriot Act.  See 
id. at *1.  For a similar expression of the principle of nonaggregation, see United States v. Jones, 625 
F.3d 766, 769 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Sentelle, C.J., dissenting) (“The reasonable expectation of privacy 
as to a person’s movements on the highway is . . . zero.  The sum of an infinite number of zero-
value parts is also zero.”); cf. Wainwright v. Lockhart, 80 F.3d 1226, 1233 (8th Cir. 1996) (“Errors 
that are not unconstitutional individually cannot be added together to create a constitutional 
violation.”).  But see generally Kerry Abrams & Brandon L. Garrett, Cumulative Constitutional Rights, 97 
B.U. L. REV. 1309 (2017) (collecting exceptions to the rule that a series of constitutional acts cannot 
be aggregated into an unconstitutional act). 
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this principle of nonaggregation in an age of low-cost digital technologies are 
remarkable.   
In order to understand why, it is helpful to understand how courts 
analyze the constitutionality under the Fourth Amendment of a government 
act of digital surveillance.  Assuming a party has standing to contest the 
constitutionality of the surveillance at all,26 courts generally begin by asking 
whether the act of surveillance constituted a “search” under the Fourth 
Amendment.  The latter inquiry is in turn based on whether the government 
violated a reasonable expectation of privacy.27  Two limitations on the scope 
of constitutional privacy are especially significant in the context of digital 
mass surveillance. 
 
 26 “To establish Article III standing, an injury must be ‘concrete, particularized, and actual or 
imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable ruling.’”  
Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 401, 409 (2013) (internal citation omitted) (holding 
that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge surveillance activities in part because their theory that 
“there is an objectively reasonable likelihood that their communications will be acquired” was “too 
speculative”); see also David Gray, Collective Standing Under the Fourth Amendment, 55 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
77, 97–103 (2018) (proposing a solution to the problem of standing and digital mass surveillance by 
arguing that “[a]ny member of ‘the people’ forced to live in fear of unreasonable searches or 
seizures by definition has standing to challenge search and seizure means, methods, and 
programs”); Christopher Slobogin, Standing and Covert Surveillance, 42 PEPP. L. REV. 517, 518 (2015) 
(analyzing the difficulty of establishing standing to challenge covert digital surveillance programs).   
A premise of this Article, however, is that standing doctrine is sufficiently flexible that if a court 
wished to confront the constitutionality of a program of digital mass surveillance under the Fourth 
Amendment, standing would not always pose an insurmountable hurdle.  See, e.g., Parents Involved 
in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 718–19 (2007) (brushing aside standing 
concerns in order to address claim of discrimination against whites).  In fact, despite Clapper v. 
Amnesty International, at least some plaintiffs have succeeded in establishing standing to challenge the 
collection of their data through digital mass surveillance programs.  See, e.g., ACLU v. Clapper, 785 
F.3d 787, 801 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding that appellant civil liberties organizations had established 
standing because “the government’s own orders demonstrate that appellants’ call records are 
indeed among those collected as part of the telephone metadata program”). 
 27 See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213, 2217 (2018) (citing Katz v. United States, 
389 U.S. 347, 351–52 (1967)); Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).  Scholars have offered 
many critiques of the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test, including critiques based on its 
manipulability, circularity, and failure to capture the purposes of the Fourth Amendment.  See, e.g., 
Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1511, 1515 (2010) (arguing that the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test should be abandoned).  The Court has also reaffirmed that 
a search takes place whenever the government engages in a physical intrusion of a constitutionally 
protected area.  See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 5–7 (2013). 
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First, because the Supreme Court has held that there is no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in what is exposed to the public,28 existing search 
doctrine suggests that nothing under the Fourth Amendment prevents the 
government from surveilling a public space.  The principle seems 
uncontroversial enough.  Surely the police, for example, should be at least as 
free to observe a public space as any member of the public.  
But once the general principle that the Fourth Amendment does not 
apply to the surveillance of public spaces is combined with the introduction 
of low-cost digital surveillance technologies and the principle of 
nonaggregation, more troubling possibilities emerge.  Is it consistent with the 
underlying values of the Fourth Amendment for the government to 
continuously, comprehensively surveil every public space in a city using a 
panoply of digital video cameras, microphones, and other sensors—
including not only fixed cameras but police dashboard cams and bodycams, 
cameras in public transportation, and cameras mounted on drones—with 
the results continuously transmitted to a centralized system for real-time 
facial recognition, license plate analysis, and permanent storage?29  Is it 
consistent with the Fourth Amendment for the government to keep a 
 
 28 See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40–41 (1988) (holding that there was no search 
where the police inspected garbage that was “exposed . . . to the public,” because “the police cannot 
reasonably be expected to avert their eyes from evidence of criminal activity that could have been 
observed by any member of the public”); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) (holding 
that there was no search where the police conducted aerial surveillance of defendant’s backyard); 
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 707, 716 (1984) (holding that use of beeper to track a can of 
ether into private home was a search because, unlike in Knotts, the property had been “withdrawn 
from public view”); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82, 285 (1983) (holding that use of 
beeper to track vehicle as it traveled along public roads was not a search because “[a] person 
travelling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
movements from one place to another,” and the driver “voluntarily conveyed to anyone who 
wanted to look the fact that he was traveling over particular roads”).  David Gray refers to this 
principle as “the public observation doctrine,” in order to distinguish it from the “third-party 
doctrine,” discussed below.  Compare Gray, supra note 26, at 77, with sources cited infra note 35. 
 29 On the Fourth Amendment problems created by facial recognition technology in particular, see 
Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Facial Recognition and the Fourth Amendment, 105 MINN. L. REV. 
(forthcoming).  Current Fourth Amendment case law also places no constraints on the government 
collection of DNA samples from public spaces.  See generally Elizabeth E. Joh, DNA Theft: Recognizing 
the Crime of Nonconsensual Genetic Collection and Testing, 91 B.U. L. REV. 665, 666 (2011) (“[T]he 
nonconsensual collection and analysis of another person’s DNA is virtually unconstrained by law.”); 
Elizabeth E. Joh, Reclaiming “Abandoned” DNA: The Fourth Amendment and Genetic Privacy, 100 NW. L. 
REV. 857, 858 (2006) (questioning the consequences of allowing DNA collection by the government 
to remain largely unregulated). 
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permanent, searchable30 record of every step, every trip to the psychiatrist, 
bar, or mosque, every discernable movement of the lips, every sign of illness 
or anger, by every inhabitant of a city in the United States, into perpetuity?31  
Under current doctrine, all such surveillance is categorically outside the 
scope of Fourth Amendment protection, because it simply collects 
information exposed to the public.  If the installation of one camera in a 
public space is constitutional, so is the installation of ten thousand, or ten 
million.32 
Second, the principle of nonaggregation and the development of low-cost 
digital surveillance technology interacts in an even more troubling way with 
the Supreme Court’s long-disputed,33 recently limited,34 but still very much 
alive “third-party doctrine,” which holds that when an individual exposes 
materials to a third party, the individual loses any reasonable expectation 
 
 30 See Emily Berman, When Database Queries Are Fourth Amendment Searches, 102 MINN. L. REV. 577, 578 
(2017) (“So long as its collection is lawful, the Fourth Amendment has nothing to say about how 
information is employed.”); Slobogin, Databases, supra note 22, at 212 (citing Erin Murphy, DNA in 
the Criminal Justice System: A Congressional Research Service Report* (*From the Future), 64 UCLA L. REV. 
DISCOURSE 340, 364 (2016)) (noting that “the Constitution appears to have little to say about law 
enforcement agencies’ access to . . . information once they or other government entities legitimately 
collect it”). 
 31 Against the objection that political forces would prevent the development of city-wide digital 
surveillance in our democracy, it might be argued that the limits of political tolerance for the 
surveillance of public spaces are far from clear, and may be especially weak if the surveillance is 
covert or if it is concentrated in, for example, “high crime areas” or politically marginalized 
communities.  See infra Conclusion (discussing equal protection issues in digital mass surveillance).  
It might also be noted that democratic forces did not prevent, to take one example, the NYPD from 
establishing a “Domain Awareness System” that integrates public and private surveillance camera 
footage with information from license plate readers and MetroCard swipes.  See Faiza Patel & 
Michael Price, Keeping Eyes on NYPD Surveillance, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (June 13, 2017), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/keeping-eyes-nypd-surveillance. 
 32 See generally EYES EVERYWHERE: THE GLOBAL GROWTH OF CAMERA SURVEILLANCE (Aaron 
Doyle et al. eds., 2012).  Analysts estimate there are roughly 770 million security cameras in the 
world today, roughly half of them in China, and that the global total will increase to more than one 
billion by the end of 2021.  Liza Lin & Newley Purnell, A World With a Billion Cameras Watching You 
Is Just Around the Corner, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 6, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-billion-
surveillance-cameras-forecast-to-be-watching-within-two-years-11575565402 (noting the “number 
of surveillance cameras in the U.S. would grow to 85 million by 2021, from 70 million last year, as 
American schools, malls and offices seek to tighten security on their premises”); see also Paul Mozur, 
Inside China’s Dystopian Dreams: A.I., Shame and Lots of Cameras, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/08/business/china-surveillance-technology.html. 
 33 See, e.g., Jane Bambauer, Other People’s Papers, 94 TEX. L. REV. 205, 208 (2015) (arguing that there 
is “good reason” to dismantle the third-party doctrine, because it “always strained the logic and 
common sense of search and seizure law”). 
 34 See discussion of Carpenter infra Part III.A. 
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that what has been exposed will remain private.35  Because, again, the Fourth 
Amendment does not generally offer protections against search where there 
is no reasonable expectation of privacy, the third-party doctrine generally 
holds that the government is free to obtain the exposed materials from the 
third party without any Fourth Amendment restrictions.36  
The FISC’s conclusion that the NSA’s warrantless bulk collection of 
Americans’ phone call metadata did not violate the Fourth Amendment 
illustrates the troubling consequences when the third-party doctrine meets 
digital technology and the principle of nonaggregation.37  Based on a 1979 
Supreme Court holding that there was no search when the police collected a 
list of the numbers dialed on a single suspect’s phone as part of a criminal 
investigation,38 the FISC effectively concluded that under the Fourth 
Amendment, the government may collect, analyze, and permanently store 
the digital communications metadata of every American, continuously and 
for all time, without ever showing any evidentiary basis or law enforcement 
need.39  Again, we might wonder: is it consistent with the underlying values 
 
 35 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy 
in record of telephone numbers dialed because the numbers were conveyed to the third-party phone 
company); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (holding that there was no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in financial records at a bank because “the Fourth Amendment does not 
prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government 
authorities”).  See generally Solove, supra note 21 (discussing third-party doctrine in the context of 
digital data collection).  If location tracking cases such as Knotts and Karo analyze the boundaries of 
the reasonable expectation of privacy by emphasizing the distinction between public spaces and 
private spaces, third-party doctrine cases such as Miller and Smith emphasize, by contrast, the 
“assumption of risk” principle—that is, the notion that someone takes a “risk, in revealing his affairs 
to another, that the information will be conveyed by that person to the Government.”  See Smith, 
442 U.S. at 743–44; Miller, 425 U.S. at 443 (citing Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966)) 
(“Neither this Court nor any member of it has ever expressed the view that the Fourth Amendment 
protects a wrongdoer’s misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his 
wrongdoing will not reveal it.”); see also supra note 28 (discussing Knotts and Karo).  From an abstract 
point of view, of course, holding that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in what is 
exposed to the public could be seen as a special case of the more general principle that there is no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in what is exposed to a specific third party entity. 
 36 See supra note 35. 
 37 See In re F.B.I., No. BR 13-109, 2013 WL 5741573, at *2–3 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013). 
 38 See Smith, 442 U.S. at 745–46. 
 39 See generally Donohue, supra note 22 (discussing the relation between bulk telephone metadata 
collection and Smith).  Of course, a variety of statutes regulate the government collection of digital 
data.  See Solove, supra note 21, at 1085–86, 1138–51 (describing how “[i]n the void left by the 
absence of Fourth Amendment protection, a series of statutes provide some limited restraints on 
government access to third party records,” and analyzing some of the relevant statutes); infra 
Conclusion (arguing that legislation, regulation, and social mobilization are likely the most 
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of the Fourth Amendment for the government to keep a comprehensive, 
permanent, searchable digital record of every person or entity with whom I 
have ever exchanged a phone call,40 email, text message, or for that matter 
physical letter?41 
In fact, the perils of combining the principle of nonaggregation with the 
third-party doctrine in an era of low-cost digital technology extend even 
further than the bulk collection of digital communications metadata.  The 
digital data Americans share with third parties potentially include streaming 
video and audio from our smartphones and smart home appliances;42 any 
 
significant and urgent avenues for the protection of digital privacy in the United States today).  
Perhaps the most important statutory protection for the communications metadata records that 
have been one of the primary focuses of digital mass surveillance in the United States is the Stored 
Communications Act (“SCA”).  See Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) of 1986, P.L. 
99-508, 100 Stat. 1848, 1860–68 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2523, 2701–2713); Susan 
Freiwald & Stephen Wm. Smith, The Carpenter Chronicle: A Near-Perfect Surveillance, 132 HARV. L. 
REV. 205, 208 (2018) (discussing the SCA); infra note 128 (same).  It is also worth emphasizing that 
the Fourth Amendment has been interpreted to protect the contents of communications in many 
contexts, even when the contents are transmitted through a third party such as a mail carrier, a 
telephone service provider, or an email or Internet service provider.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 283–88 (6th Cir. 2010) (protecting the contents of e-mails); Ex parte Jackson, 
96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878) (protecting the contents of letters).  See generally Chris Conley, Non-Content Is 
Not Non-Sensitive: Moving Beyond the Content/Non-Content Distinction, 54 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 821, 824 
(2014) (“The distinction between content and non-content has been part of the Supreme Court’s 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence since the nineteenth century.”); Matthew J. Tokson, The 
Content/Envelope Distinction in Internet Law, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105 (2009) (“Whether a 
component of an Internet communication is classified as ‘content’ or ‘envelope’ information 
determines in large part the privacy protection it receives under constitutional and statutory law.”). 
 40 See Smith, 442 U.S. at 741–42, 745–46 (determining that Fourth Amendment protections do not 
apply to call records); KERR, supra note 22, at *45 (arguing that even in the wake of Carpenter, 
“[n]umbers dialed for phone calls should continue to be unprotected under Smith v. Maryland”). 
 41 The United States Postal Service (“USPS”) has begun “photographing and recording the outside 
of each of the roughly 160 billion mail parcels it handles each year.”  Julie Lynn Rooney, Note, 
Going Postal: Analyzing the Abuse of Mail Covers Under the Fourth Amendment, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1627, 
1629 (2017).  In addition, through its “mail cover” surveillance program, “throughout 2014 the 
USPS documented, at the request of law enforcement agencies, the addresses, return addresses, 
postal dates, and other information appearing on the outside of each parcel of mail sent and 
received by over 50,000 individuals for extended periods of time.”  Id. at 1628–29.  The Supreme 
Court has held that the outsides of envelopes are not protected by the Fourth Amendment.  See Ex 
parte Jackson, 96 U.S. at 733; discussion supra note 39. 
 42 See, e.g., Chavie Lieber, Amazon’s Alexa Might Be a Key Witness in a Murder Case, VOX (Nov. 12, 2018), 
https://www.vox.com/the-goods/2018/11/12/18089090/amazon-echo-alexa-smart-speaker-pr
ivacy-data (describing how a court ordered Amazon to produce audio records from an Echo device, 
and recounting other investigative requests for data from devices such as iPhones and Fitbits); Ben 
Popken, Your Smart TV Is Watching You Watching TV, Consumer Reports Finds, NBC NEWS (Feb. 7, 
2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/security/your-smart-tv-watching-you-watching-tv-consu
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private documents we save in the cloud;43 any records of our digital activity 
captured by social media platforms or other websites, apps, or devices, 
including, for example, location data or health-related information; financial 
records from banks and credit card companies;44 Internet service provider 
records of web sites visited, which in many cases might indirectly reveal the 
contents of communications;45 similar tracking information provided by a 
web browser’s cookies or extensions; and even digitized medical records from 
doctors’ offices, which the Supreme Court has never held to be protected by 
a reasonable expectation of privacy.46  Would it be consistent with the values 
underlying the Fourth Amendment for the government to collect, store, and 
 
mer-reports-finds-n845456 (describing how “[m]illions of smart TVs sitting in family living rooms 
. . . could be tracking the household’s personal viewing habits much more closely than their owners 
realize”); Amy B. Wang, ‘I’m in Your Baby’s Room’: A Hacker Took Over a Baby Monitor and Broadcast 
Threats, Parents Say, WASH. POST (Dec. 20, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/
2018/12/20/nest-cam-baby-monitor-hacked-kidnap-threat-came-device-parents-say/ (describing 
surveillance through hacked home security and baby monitoring devices).  The government would 
presumably require a warrant to engage in video surveillance within someone’s home, which the 
Fourth Amendment has always treated as the quintessentially private space.  See, e.g., United States 
v. Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248, 251–52 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that the government needed a 
warrant to engage in video surveillance of a backyard).  But to the extent that a person sent a video 
to a business with the expectation that someone at the business would view it, the sender would 
presumably have no reasonable expectation of privacy under the third-party doctrine.  See supra 
note 35.  The case is less clear when the video is transmitted to a business as a routine part of its 
creation, such as when wireless cameras transmit videos to a third party for viewing on an app, or 
when a video is saved in cloud storage.  Cf. KERR, supra note 22 (implying that Fourth Amendment 
might not protect digital data stored by a third-party business if “participation in modern society” 
did not require use of the technology, if “a user made a voluntary decision to allow a third-party to 
generate that record,” or if “a person volunteers to reveal information about himself to others, 
beyond what the technology requires”);  Eric Johnson, Note, Lost in the Cloud: Cloud Storage, Privacy, 
and Suggestions for Protecting Users’ Data, 69 STAN. L. REV. 867 (2017) (suggesting Fourth Amendment 
protection of data stored in the cloud depends in part on the terms of service). 
 43 See generally Neil Richards, The Third Party Doctrine and the Future of the Cloud, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 
1441 (2017); Johnson, supra note 42. 
 44 See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 437 (1976).  Credit card companies already sell records 
of credit card transactions to other businesses.  See, e.g., Mark Bergen & Jennifer Surane, Google and 
Mastercard Cut a Secret Ad Deal To Track Retail Sales, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 31, 2018), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-30/google-and-mastercard-cut-a-secret-ad-
deal-to-track-retail-sales.  
 45 See Donohue, supra note 21, at 556. 
 46 See Solove, supra note 27, at 1532 (noting that Miller would seem to dictate that the Supreme Court 
should “hold that people lack an expectation of privacy in their medical data because they convey 
that information to their physicians,” even though the result would “strike many as absurd”).  But 
see Stephen E. Henderson, After United States v. Jones, After the Fourth Amendment Third Party Doctrine, 
14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 431, 444 (2013) (noting that some lower courts have “granted Fourth 
Amendment protection to medical records residing with a third party provider”). 
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analyze all of the preceding categories of data, simply because that data was 
transmitted to a third-party business? 
In the landmark 2018 decision Carpenter v. United States,47 the Supreme 
Court took a significant step toward addressing the threats to privacy created 
by the third-party doctrine in the digital age, recognizing for the first time an 
exception to the doctrine in the context of the government collection of 
digital data.48  But Chief Justice Roberts’ majority opinion in Carpenter, 
discussed at greater length below,49 only explicitly excludes from the third-
party doctrine certain cell-site location information (“CSLI”) generated by 
cell phones.50  In addition, rather than grappling with how the rise of low-
cost digital surveillance technologies radically alters the privacy effects of the 
doctrine that what is exposed to the public is not protected by the Fourth 
Amendment, Roberts’ opinion explicitly notes that “[o]ur decision today” 
does not “call into question conventional surveillance techniques and tools, 
such as security cameras.”51  Based on this cautionary note, and in the interest of 
simplicity, the examples and hypothetical scenarios in the remainder of this 
Article will largely focus on the constitutional protection of digital data 
shared with third parties, rather than the surveillance of public spaces using 
digital technologies.52 
 
 47 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
 48 See id. at 2217. 
 49 See infra Part III. 
 50 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217. 
 51 Id. at 2220 (emphasis added). 
 52 An attempt to apply the reasoning in this Article to the problem of the digital mass surveillance of 
public spaces might begin by noting that nearly all of the most dystopian privacy implications of 
the mass surveillance of public spaces depend on some automated technological means of 
identifying and recording the locations and behaviors of individuals, such as facial recognition, gate 
recognition, or license plate reading.  A case could be made that in a world where low-cost digital 
technologies facilitate the pervasive, constant surveillance of public spaces, automated recognition 
technologies pose such a profound and unprecedented threat to privacy that they justify a dramatic 
departure in Fourth Amendment doctrine, similar to the departure Carpenter carried out with regard 
to the third-party doctrine.  Cf. Evan Selinger & Woodrow Hartzog, Opinion, What Happens When 
Employers Can Read Your Facial Expressions?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/10/17/opinion/facial-recognition-ban.html (“Facial recognition is truly a one-of-a-kind 
technology—and we should treat it as such.”).  Thus, rather than attempting to carve out an 
exception to the doctrine that what is exposed to the public is not protected by the Fourth 
Amendment—an exception that seems especially unlikely in light of Carpenter’s dictum regarding 
surveillance cameras—the constitutional problem of the mass digital surveillance of public spaces 
could perhaps be addressed by carving out an exception to the doctrine that the Fourth Amendment 
does not regulate the government’s use of information it has already collected.  See Berman, supra 
note 30, at 578 (“[T]here are no constitutional restrictions at all on how the government uses this 
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Even with regard to digital data held by third parties, however, it remains 
deeply unclear how far and in what ways the Supreme Court will extend 
Fourth Amendment privacy protections based on Carpenter.53  Above all, it 
remains unclear, even in the wake of Carpenter, how the Court might respond 
to the particular problems of digital mass surveillance.  It has often been 
remarked that Fourth Amendment doctrine has been distorted by being 
developed, for the most part, in the context of motions by criminal 
defendants to suppress evidence.54  A court may be more likely to find a 
practice constitutionally unobjectionable if the court only sees examples of 
the practice that resulted in the decision to prosecute.  Courts might perceive 
a practice very differently if they were instead routinely exposed to the 
individuals who were subjected to the practice without any charges 
ultimately being filed.55 
Less attention has been paid to the way that the “transactional”56 focus 
of the Fourth Amendment effectively eliminates the possibility of recognizing 
 
vast expanse of data.”).  Courts could, for example, develop Fourth Amendment restrictions on the 
application of automated recognition technologies to the surveillance of public spaces.  Cf. LAURA 
K. DONOHUE, THE FUTURE OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 153–54 (2016) (arguing for a “use 
restriction for Fourth Amendment doctrine,” and citing as indirect support Riley v. California, 573 
U.S. 373 (2014)); Harold J. Krent, Of Diaries and Data Banks: Use Restrictions Under the Fourth Amendment, 
74 TEX. L. REV. 49, 51 (1995) (arguing for use restrictions under the Fourth Amendment). 
But it must be conceded that this would be a very significant departure from Fourth Amendment 
doctrine and could be seen as opening up a Pandora’s box of Fourth Amendment challenges to the 
government use of data in other contexts.  Because this Article is focused on plausible doctrinal 
responses to digital mass surveillance that are grounded in existing Fourth Amendment case law, it 
will not address the problem of the digital mass surveillance of public spaces further.  Under existing 
Fourth Amendment doctrine, this problem may simply have no plausible solution. 
 53 See, e.g., KERR, supra note 22 (considering how to apply Carpenter to contexts involving digital data 
other than historical CSLI records); Eunice Park, Objects, Places and Cyber-Spaces Post-Carpenter: 
Extending the Third-Party Doctrine Beyond CSLI, 21 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1 (2019). 
 54 See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV. 881, 912–13 
(1991); see also Nancy Leong, Making Rights, 92 B.U. L. REV. 405, 428 (2012). 
 55 To take the familiar example of “stop-and-frisk,” if courts were routinely exposed to the stories of 
the thousands of individuals who are stopped, questioned, and frisked without any further evidence 
of criminal activity being uncovered, rather than only to the stories of those comparatively few 
individuals who are arrested, charged, and then move to suppress the evidence obtained through 
their stops, it is easy to imagine courts insisting on a more exacting standard of “reasonable 
suspicion” than police departments have sometimes employed. 
 56 For the critique of Fourth Amendment doctrine as excessively shaped by a focus on individual 
encounters or “transactions” rather than programmatic or systemic considerations, see generally 
Aziz Z. Huq, The Consequences of Disparate Policing: Evaluating Stop and Frisk as a Modality of Urban Policing, 
101 MINN. L. REV. 2397 (2017); Tracey L. Meares, Programming Errors: Understanding the 
Constitutionality of Stop-and-Frisk as a Program, Not an Incident, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 159 (2015).  For a 
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any constitutional difference between a potentially objectionable act being 
carried out in relation to a single individual, in an ad hoc manner, on one 
occasion, and the same act being carried out programmatically in relation to 
a hundred or indeed three hundred and fifty million individuals.  Intuitively, 
it might seem that it should sometimes make some difference under the 
Fourth Amendment whether an act of surveillance is carried out on a one-
time, individually focused basis, or through perpetual mass surveillance 
affecting nearly every member of the population.  But as the FISC suggested, 
under existing doctrine, if an act is not a “search” when carried out once, 
then it requires no evidentiary justification under the Fourth Amendment to 
be carried out on an unlimited number of subjects.57 
In the Founding Era, when every search tended to require a significant 
expenditure of human labor, and the federal government had relatively few 
employees, the threat of a constitutional form of investigation increasing in 
quantity until it became a qualitatively different threat to the values protected 
by the Fourth Amendment might have seemed minor.58  But as Warren and 
Brandeis already recognized in 1890, the development of technologies 
capable of mechanical reproduction can change what permissions and 
prohibitions are necessary to protect privacy.59  Their insight is even more 
true in the age of digital reproduction.  As noted above, it has now become 
technologically feasible for governments to replicate certain forms of 
centralized, digital surveillance across whole populations.  Yet the Fourth 
Amendment has thus far appeared incapable of recognizing that this 
replication has any legal significance.  
The next Part will turn to a discussion of seizure doctrine, with the 
ultimate goal of suggesting that it shows a way in which Fourth Amendment 
doctrine can respond to problematic increases in the frequency of 
constitutionally problematic acts.  But before entering that discussion, it will 
 
more general critique of the way transactions are framed in constitutional law, see generally Daryl 
J. Levinson, Framing Transactions in Constitutional Law, 111 YALE L.J. 1311 (2002). 
 57 See In re F.B.I., No. BR 13-109, 2013 WL 5741573, at *2 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013). 
 58 It might be noted, however, that even in the Founding Era, the drafters of the Fourth Amendment 
were particularly hostile to general warrants, and digital mass surveillance practices such as bulk 
collection of metadata could be seen as the contemporary equivalents of general warrants.  See 
Slobogin, supra note 21, at 1722–23 (discussing the Fourth Amendment’s hostility to general 
warrants in relation to “panvasive” digital surveillance). 
 59 See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195–96 
(1890) (arguing for a common-law right to privacy partly in response to the growing use of 
photographs in mass-produced newspapers). 
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be helpful to clarify certain distinctions that the preceding discussion 
deliberately blurred in order to draw attention to the inadequacies of the 
existing Fourth Amendment law of digital search.  
Going forward, this Article will keep distinct two senses of the “quantity” 
of surveillance.  The principle of nonaggregation only applies to one of the 
two.  On the one hand, we can speak of the quantity of surveillance 
conducted on an individual over some period of time, or—viewing the same 
surveillance in terms of its results—the quantity of information collected 
about an individual.  As discussed in Part IV, the “mosaic theory” of digital 
search already allows for the aggregation of this quantity.  As a result, existing 
Fourth Amendment doctrine already provides a basis, at least in principle, 
for placing constitutional limits on the quantity of surveillance directed 
toward an individual, or the quantity of information collected about her.  
On the other hand, we can speak of the quantity of individuals subjected 
to some form of surveillance.  In the interests of clarity, the Article will 
henceforth refer to this sense of quantity as the “frequency” of surveillance.  
As the quotation from the FISC opinion above suggested,60 current Fourth 
Amendment doctrine does not allow for the aggregation of acts of 
surveillance across individuals.  As a result, the Fourth Amendment is 
doctrinally blind to increases or decreases in the frequency of constitutionally 
problematic acts.  Because the ultimate goal of this Article is to propose a 
path for the reasonable constitutional regulation of digital mass surveillance 
that departs as little as possible from existing Fourth Amendment doctrine, 
the Article assumes that this “principle of nonaggregation” will remain in 
place. 
It might be objected at this point that the frequency of digital surveillance 
should make no difference whatsoever to the Fourth Amendment, because it 
does not matter to any individual’s privacy.61  If the quantity of information 
collected regarding any given individual remains low enough, why does it 
matter if that quantity is collected regarding a handful of individuals, or three 
 
 60 See supra text accompanying note 25. 
 61 Generally speaking, aggregative reasoning will often be a useful doctrinal tool when courts are 
attempting to address constitutional harms that have a cumulative nature, especially where the 
accumulation of harm results from an accumulation of government acts—as in both the cumulative 
harm to liberty of repeated acts of coercion during a street encounter, and the cumulative harm to 
privacy of prolonged surveillance.  It will also be useful when courts are attempting to determine 
whether an act was justified, and the justification has a cumulative nature—as in the accumulation 
of suspicious acts that can together constitute reasonable suspicion or probable cause.  It is often 
harder to see how increases in the frequency of surveillance have cumulative effects. 
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hundred million of them?  In response to any of the ominous hypotheticals 
discussed above—the pervasive use of digital cameras, the collection of credit 
card records—it might be argued that either the practice, left unregulated, 
results in a constitutionally unacceptable quantity of surveillance of some 
individual, or it does not.  In the former case, the practice should be 
constitutionally regulated, while in the latter case, it should not be.  But in 
any case, the number of individuals affected makes no normative difference. 
At least three objections might be offered to this line of argument.  First, 
intuitively, it might be argued that the frequency of surveillance within a 
society can alter the effect of that surveillance on the character of the society, 
or the lives of those individuals living within it.  It is one thing to know that 
an arbitrary but moderate intrusion on privacy may happen to a few unlucky 
individuals.  It is another thing entirely to know that the same intrusion is 
happening to everyone, or everyone fitting some description.  In the former 
case, most people may ignore the risk and continue to think and act as they 
wish, without fear of their acting and thinking being monitored and recorded 
for future, potentially adverse use.  But to the extent that surveillance 
becomes more likely, individuals may become more cautious, self-censoring, 
and less free.  The Fourth Amendment is concerned not only with individuals 
but with “[t]he right of the people”—collectively—to be secure from 
unreasonable search.62  If changes in the frequency of a surveillance practice 
can alter the people’s sense of security, then it seems unwise to dismiss the 
relevance of frequency to the Fourth Amendment out of hand. 
Second, a sufficient increase in the frequency of moderately intrusive 
surveillance may in some circumstances result in a greater intrusion of the 
privacy of all or many of the individuals surveilled.  Assume that the 
government collects information from a social media platform about the 
social network of one individual, and happens to have the same type of 
information about five of the individual’s connections.  The government may 
be able to draw certain inferences about the first individual based on the data 
from the five other individuals, and these inferences may represent a mild 
intrusion into the privacy of the first individual.  Assume the quantity of the 
privacy intrusion is x, and that this quantity falls below the threshold 
necessary to constitute a Fourth Amendment search.  By contrast, assume 
that the government collects information from the social media platform with 
 
 62 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added); see Gray, supra note 26, at 97–103 (emphasizing the 
Fourth Amendment as a collective right). 
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a far greater frequency, such that the government possesses data about 
virtually all of the first individual’s connections, and their connections, and 
their connections as well.  It seems plausible that as a result of this greater 
frequency of surveillance, the government might be able to draw inferences 
about the first individual that represent a quantity of privacy intrusion far 
greater than x.  Again, contrary to the objection offered above, a change in 
the frequency of surveillance seems to have resulted in an increased threat to 
the privacy values that the Fourth Amendment is supposed to protect. 
Third, the two preceding points can intersect in the context of digital 
surveillance using “big data,” machine learning, or other forms of artificial 
intelligence.  The greater the frequency of surveillance, the larger the data 
set that the government can aggregate and then mine for predictive patterns.  
An increase in the frequency of surveillance may ultimately enable the 
government to make more privacy-invasive predictions about an individual 
than otherwise would have been possible based on a given quantity of 
information about the individual.  A change in the frequency of surveillance, 
in other words, can bring about a change in the degree to which an 
individual’s privacy has been invaded, even if the quantity of information the 
government has about that specific individual remains the same.63 
Fortunately, Fourth Amendment doctrine has shown itself able to 
respond, albeit indirectly, to changes in the frequency of constitutionally 
problematic practices, despite the principle of nonaggregation.  As Part II 
suggests, Terry can be understood as a response to a perceived rise in the 
frequency of stop-and-frisk.  Part III.A argues that Carpenter similarly 
responds, in part, to a threatened rise in the frequency of location tracking 
using cell phones. 
II. TERRY AS A RESPONSE TO MASS SEIZURE 
A. Stop-and-Frisk in the Years Before Terry 
Outside of legal circles, if Terry v. Ohio is known at all today, it is known 
by association with the racially unequal “stop-and-frisk” programs expanded 
 
 63 On the privacy-invasive potential of data-mining, big data, and machine-learning technology, see 
generally Slobogin, Data Mining, supra note 22; Aziz Z. Huq, Racial Equity in Algorithmic Criminal 
Justice, 68 DUKE L.J. 1043 (2019); Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar & Aziz Z. Huq, Privacy’s Political 
Economy and the State of Machine Learning: An Essay in Honor of Stephen J. Schulhofer, 72 NYU ANN. SURV. 
AM. L. (forthcoming). 
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by urban police departments beginning in the 1990s.64  A closer look at the 
historical background of Terry suggests a potential irony in this association.  
Despite the uses and abuses of Terry in the era of mass incarceration, the 
history behind Terry suggests that it was originally intended in part to 
foreclose the kind of large-scale, individually indiscriminate but racially 
discriminatory uses of stop-and-frisk with which the case later became 
associated.  Terry attempted to prevent mass stops by requiring 
individualized, reasonable suspicion as a basis for any stop.  It was intended 
as a reaction against the growing use of aggressive, indiscriminate stops by 
urban police departments in the 1960s, not as an authorization for such stops. 
To begin with, the history of programmatic stop-and-frisk preceded Terry 
and was not created by it.  As Tracey Meares has noted, the police chief of 
San Francisco, Thomas Cahill, deployed a program resembling systematic 
stop-and-frisk “in the 1950s, a full decade before Terry was decided.”65  
Cahill launched “Operation S” on the streets of San Francisco.  “S” stood 
for saturation, and the program called for flooding San Francisco’s high crime 
areas with roughly fifty officers who stopped, questioned, frisked, and 
 
 64 See generally Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding that New 
York City’s stop-and-frisk practices violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments); MICHAEL 
D. WHITE & HENRY F. FRADELLA, STOP AND FRISK: THE USE AND ABUSE OF A 
CONTROVERSIAL POLICING TACTIC 2–6 (2016) (summarizing the rising use of stop-and-frisk and 
its racially unequal application).  For an example of the popular conflation of Terry stops with the 
unconstitutional, programmatic abuse of stop-and-frisk, see Steven A. Holmes, Reality Check: Who’s 
Right About Constitutionality of Stop-and-Frisk?, CNN (Oct. 1, 2016), https://www.cnn.com/2016/
10/01/politics/fact-check-stop-and-frisk/index.html (clarifying the ambiguity that allowed Lester 
Holt and Hillary Clinton to claim, defensibly, during a 2016 presidential debate, that stop-and-frisk 
had been ruled unconstitutional in New York City, and former New York City Mayor Rudy 
Giuliani to claim, also defensibly, that stop-and-frisk had not been ruled unconstitutional).  
For a sophisticated scholarly account that also treats Terry as “the foundation” for programmatic 
stop-and-frisk, rather than an attempt to limit its excesses, see Rachel A. Harmon & Andrew 
Manns, Proactive Policing and the Legacy of Terry, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 49, 49–50, 57–58 (2017) 
(presenting “proactive policing,” which has “very often . . . in practice meant aggressively stopping 
and frisking individuals on the street,” as “enabled by Terry,” which “[o]ne might reasonably call 
. . . the foundation on which proactive policing is built,” while also recognizing that programmatic 
stop-and-frisk “depart[s] from the kind of policing that the Terry decision described”). 
 65 Meares, supra note 56, at 167; cf. Huq, supra note 56, at 2413 n.84 (2017) (citing Alex Elkins, The 
Origins of Stop-and-Frisk, JACOBIN (May 9, 2015), https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/05/stop-
and-frisk-dragnet-ferguson-baltimore) (noting that “[t]he earliest programmatic use of SQF I have 
been able to identify occurred in Cincinnati’s Avondale neighborhood in 1958”).  Meares also co-
authored one of the few previous articles offering a sustained reflection on the similarities between 
mass digital search and the mass seizure of persons through stop-and-frisk.  See generally Bernard E. 
Harcourt & Tracey L. Meares, Randomization and the Fourth Amendment, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 809 
(2011); see also Gray, supra note 26.  
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arrested on vagrancy charges suspicious characters who police believed were 
about to break the law.  In situations that did not result in arrest, police were 
instructed to fill out identification cards . . . .  The number of stops that 
Operation S generated was prodigious for the times.  Historian Robert 
Fogelson reported that, in its first year, Operation S tallied twenty thousand 
stops, most of which were of young black men.66 
Similarly, the Kerner Commission, appointed by President Johnson in 
response to the summer 1967 riots in Newark and Detroit, singled out the 
excessive use of field interrogations as a source of police-community conflict, 
noting that field interrogations were “universally resented” by minorities.67 
It is revealing that already in the early 1960s, “the police practice 
commonly and euphemistically referred to as ‘stop and frisk’ [was] a most 
popular topic in the law reviews, and was dealt with by a number of courts.”68  
 
 66 Meares, supra note 56, at 167 (footnotes omitted) (citing ROBERT M. FOGELSON, BIG-CITY POLICE 
187–88 (1977)). 
 67 SAMUEL WALKER, THE POLICE IN AMERICA: AN INTRODUCTION 21, 206 (1983) (quoting NAT’L 
ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY 
COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (1968), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1
/Digitization/8073NCJRS.pdf [hereinafter “KERNER COMMISSION REPORT”]); Huq, supra note 
56, at 2413.  Of course, field interrogations were not the only cause of police-community tensions.  
Most of the race riots of the 1960s were sparked by a specific “incident involving the police,” often 
“shootings of African American men by white police officers.”  SAMUEL WALKER, POPULAR 
JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 197 (2d ed. 1998).  In testimony for the 
Kerner Commission, Kenneth Clark noted that a number of earlier commissions had identified 
similar police abuses as the causes of even earlier riots: 
I read the report of the 1919 riot in Chicago, and it is as if I were reading the report of the 
investigating committee on the Harlem riot of ‘35, the report of the investigating 
committee on the Harlem riot of ‘43, the report of the McCone Commission on the Watts 
riot [of 1965]. . . .  [I]t is a kind of Alice in Wonderland—with the same moving picture 
reshown over and over again, the same analysis, the same recommendations, and the same 
inaction. 
  KERNER COMMISSION REPORT, supra, at 13. 
 68 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 9.1, 
(5th ed. 2012 & Supp. 2019) (footnotes omitted).  The legal recognition of a category of detention 
short of arrest goes back to at least the seventeenth century, when English law recognized the right 
of night watchmen to temporarily detain suspicious persons.  See Harmon & Manns, supra note 64, 
at 70 (citing 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF PLEAS OF THE CROWN 128–29 (8th ed. 1824)); 
see also WHITE & FRADELLA, supra note 64, at 35–36 (citing 2 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF 
THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 96 (W. A. Stokes & E. Ingersoll eds., Robert H. Small 1847)); Richard 
M. Leagre, The Fourth Amendment and the Law of Arrest, 54 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 
393, 408–11 (1963).  Harmon and Manns note that “[w]hen stops and frisks emerged as a more 
frequently used tactic in the late 19th Century, courts in New York and California debated whether 
the practice was permitted under pre-existing statutory authority,” and “[t]o resolve the question, 
a number of states passed statutes authorizing—and limiting—stops and frisks.”  Harmon & Manns, 
supra note 64, at 70.  Although the stop-and-frisk scholarship and case law in the early 1960s, like 
Terry itself, focused on individual rather than programmatic stop-and-frisk, the fact that legal 
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Stop-and-frisk was a growing practice, and a growing focus of concern, long 
before Terry “authorized” the practice under the Fourth Amendment. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Terry itself suggests that it was self-
consciously reacting against problematic aspects of the growing use of stop-
and-frisk, rather than attempting to legalize the expansion of stop-and-frisk 
to a mass scale.  The Court quotes another presidential commission that, like 
the Kerner Commission, found that “[i]n many communities, field 
interrogations are a major source of friction between the police and minority 
groups.”69  As the Court notes: 
It was reported that the friction caused by “[m]isuse of field interrogations” 
increases “as more police departments adopt ‘aggressive patrol’ in which 
officers are encouraged routinely to stop and question persons on the street 
who are unknown to them, who are suspicious, or whose purpose for being 
abroad is not readily evident.”  While the frequency with which “frisking” 
forms a part of field interrogation practice varies tremendously with the 
locale, the objective of the interrogation, and the particular officer, it cannot 
help but be a severely exacerbating factor in police-community tensions.70 
It might also be noted that at a pivotal moment in the development and 
drafting of the Terry decision, when Justice Brennan delivered to Chief Justice 
Warren a proposed rewrite shifting the analysis from probable cause to 
reasonableness, Justice Brennan attached a cover letter noting: 
I’ve become acutely concerned that the mere fact of our affirmance in Terry 
will be taken by the police all over the country as our license to them to carry 
on, indeed widely expand, present “aggressive surveillance” techniques which 
the press tell us are being deliberately employed in Miami, Chicago, Detroit 
+ other ghetto cities.71 
 
attention to stop-and-frisk rose in the early 1960s suggests an awareness of the growing use of the 
tactic. 
 69 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14 n.11 (1968) (quoting PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENF’T & 
ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 183 (1967)). 
 70 Id. (citations omitted) (quoting PRESIDENT’S COMM’N, supra note 69, at 184).  The Court continues:  
“This is particularly true in situations where the ‘stop and frisk’ of youths or minority group 
members is ‘motivated by the officers’ perceived need to maintain the power image of the beat 
officer, an aim sometimes accomplished by humiliating anyone who attempts to undermine police 
control of the streets.’”  Id.  Meares notes that “while it is not clear whether the justices deciding 
Terry appreciated this fact, there is a great deal of evidence indicating that, at least in major cities, 
programmatic stop-and-frisk was regular police practice before Terry was decided.”  Meares, supra 
note 56, at 178.  Terry’s reference to “more” police departments adopting “aggressive patrol” seems 
to suggest some awareness of a programmatic shift in tactics.  See Terry, 392 U.S. at 14 n.11 
(quotation marks omitted). 
 71 John Q. Barrett, Deciding the Stop and Frisk Cases: A Look Inside the Supreme Court’s Conference, 72 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 749, 825 (1998) (emphasis added) (quoting Letter from William J. Brennan, Jr., 
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Many scholars have observed the difference between the “systematic,” 
“programmatic,” or “wholesale” use of stop-and-frisk by police departments, 
especially starting in the 1990s,72 and the individualized, ad hoc, “retail” use 
of stop-and-frisk envisioned by the Terry court.73  Meares distinguishes the 
programmatic use of stop-and-frisk from the kind of “one-off intervention 
into a crime in progress”74 ostensibly carried out by Officer McFadden in 
Terry and apparently contemplated by the Terry court: 
In the program context, police on patrol looking to prevent crime do not 
seek out particular crimes in progress.  Instead, they engage in assessments 
of suspicious characteristics—clothes that are out of season, suspicious bulges 
 
Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Earl Warren, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court 2 (Mar. 
14, 1968) (on file with the Library of Congress)); see also id. at 838 (noting that “Warren, the author 
of Terry, actually used much of an opinion that Justice Brennan, who is not identified as an opinion 
writer in the case, had ghost-written for Warren and persuaded him to use”). 
 72 See Huq, supra note 56, at 2398; Meares, supra note 56, at 165.  The programmatic use of stop-and-
frisk in the 1990s has intellectual roots in a 1978 article by James Q. Wilson and Barbara Boland, 
and in a Kansas City policing experiment from the early 1990s that “seemed to confirm . . . Wilson’s 
hypothesis.”  See Meares, supra note 56, at 167–69 (first citing James Q. Wilson & Barbara Boland, 
The Effect of the Police on Crime, 12 L. & SOC’Y REV. 367, 370 (1978); then citing Lawrence W. 
Sherman & Dennis P. Rogan, Effects of Gun Seizures on Gun Violence: “Hot Spots” Patrol in Kansas City, 
12 JUST. Q. 673, 675–76 (1995)).  Wilson famously went on to promote the theory of “broken 
windows” policing in a popular article, and also helped to popularize programmatic stop-and-frisk 
in the 1990s.  See James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood 
Safety, ATLANTIC (Mar. 1982), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/
broken-windows/304465/; James Q. Wilson, Just Take Away Their Guns, N.Y. TIMES MAG. 47, Mar. 
20, 1994.  
 73 See Jeffrey Fagan & Amanda Geller, Following the Script: Narratives of Suspicion in Terry Stops in Street 
Policing, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 51, 61 (2015) (“Stop-and-frisk as envisioned by the Terry Court was 
largely a set of distinct ‘retail’ transactions, characterized by individualization, material or visual 
indicia, and specificity.  But the current ‘wholesale’ practice is quite different from the vision of the 
Terry Court.”); see also Huq, supra note 56, at 2402 (offering a critique of programmatic stop-and-
frisk but noting “I have no cavil with the retail use of Terry stops as an element of nonprogrammatic 
street policing”).  Judge Scheindlin made a similar point in one of the 2013 stop-and-frisk cases: 
Not only are the consequences of stops different today than they were in 1968, but the 
frequency of stops is far higher as well.  As the stops have increased in frequency, they have 
also become more standardized and predictable.  In Terry, the Supreme Court emphasized 
“the myriad daily situations in which policemen and citizens confront each other on the 
street.”  “No judicial opinion can comprehend the protean variety of the street encounter, 
and we can only judge the facts of the case before us.”  In the instant case, by contrast, the 
contested police encounters are strikingly uniform.  The stops in the decline to prosecute 
forms echo the stops of plaintiffs, which in turn echo aspects of the training materials 
introduced at the hearing.  Terry envisions street stops as uniquely tailored to unforeseen 
circumstances.  The stops in the instant case are more like the products of fixed, repeatable 
processes. 
  Ligon v. City of New York, 925 F. Supp. 2d 478, 540–41 n.445 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 74 Meares, supra note 56, at 163. 
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in clothing, furtive movements, age, gender, and so on. . . .  [T]he officer 
[may] act simply on the basis of suspicious characteristics, making an 
assumption that anyone who looks a certain way is someone who could be a 
person about to engage in crime.75 
In practice, it is probably inevitable that many of the stops resulting from 
such a program will lack the kind of individualized evidentiary basis that the 
Terry court attempted to require.76  Yet in a perverse turn of history, police 
departments have routinely used Terry as a source of legal authority for such 
programs—arguably the kinds of programs of “aggressive patrol” that the 
Court intended Terry to curtail.77  
It might be objected that this outcome illustrates the weakness of Terry’s 
approach to the Fourth Amendment, and perhaps suggests the wisdom of 
Justice Douglas’s demand, in his dissent, that every seizure be supported by 
probable cause, even when the seizure does not rise to the level of a formal 
arrest.78  But such an objection probably assumes an unrealistic view of the 
force of Supreme Court doctrine to resist the pressures of political change.  If 
Terry eventually came to be used as an authorization for the very programs 
of widespread, non-individualized field interrogation that the decision was 
originally intended to constrain or prohibit, and if courts for the most part 
did nothing to correct the misunderstanding,79 this outcome probably tells us 
less about the weakness of Terry’s doctrinal approach than it does about the 
general malleability of constitutional precedent, the inevitable role of politics 
in constitutional law, and the changing politics of crime, race, and civil 
liberties in the years after 1968.  It is difficult to imagine any Fourth 
Amendment decision issued in 1968 providing an effective bulwark against 
the demands for aggressive, proactive policing during an era of rising violent 
crime that also happened to be dominated by a politics of racist backlash.80  
 
 75 Id. 
 76 This certainly seems to be what happened in New York.  See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 959 
F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 77 See, e.g., Ligon, 925 F. Supp. 2d at 520. 
 78 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 35 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also Paul Butler, “A Long Step Down the Totalitarian 
Path”: Justice Douglas’s Great Dissent in Terry v. Ohio, 79 MISS. L.J. 9 (2009). 
 79 See Barrett, supra note 71, at 827–28 n.465 (citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 161–62 (1972) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting)) (describing how Justice Marshall came to regret his vote with the majority 
in Terry, praising the prescience of Justice Douglas’s dissent); Carol S. Steiker, Terry Unbound, 82 
MISS. L.J. 329, 332 (2013) (arguing that “a comparison of Warren’s opinion for the Court in Terry 
with Rehnquist’s opinions on later Terry issues reveals some crucial differences in emphasis”). 
 80 See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE 
OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010); WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL 
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In particular, one suspects that if Justice Douglas’s proposal had been 
adopted in 1968, the result might have been a gradual redefinition over the 
following decades of “seizure” and “search” so that, for example, courts 
would eventually have held that the stops and frisks in the New York Police 
Department’s (“NYPD”) program in the early 2010s were in the vast 
majority of cases not so coercive as to justify Fourth Amendment protection.  
Perhaps the Supreme Court would have dismissed everything short of 
Officer McFadden’s use of force as implicitly “consensual.”81  As Christopher 
Slobogin has noted, “[w]hen a search requires probable cause to be 
constitutional, courts are naturally more reluctant to denominate every 
police attempt to find evidence a search.”82 
In sum, the Supreme Court’s decision in Terry to require that police 
officers have reasonable suspicion of a suspect’s criminal activity before they 
 
JUSTICE (2011).  Indeed, temporary detentions based on less than probable cause were a routine 
police practice long before Terry, even when they were widely recognized as illegal under the 
common law of arrest.  See SARAH A. SEO, POLICING THE OPEN ROAD: HOW CARS 
TRANSFORMED AMERICAN FREEDOM 148 (2019) (quoting a drafter of the Uniform Arrest Act 
stating that “the new laws ‘would probably have no effect on police practices’ because the police 
were already stopping and frisking notwithstanding their present illegality’”).  To the extent that 
most police, most courts, and most of the public, or at least parts of the public with relevant legal 
influence and political power, believed that temporary detentions based on less than probable cause 
were an important and reasonable tool of policing, it seems almost inevitable that Fourth 
Amendment law would ultimately, one way or another, have accommodated the practice.  See id. 
at 150 (noting that in the years leading up to Terry, “[s]ome reformers eventually came around to 
the view that only by legalizing brief seizures and frisks could the law at least regulate practices that 
were going to continue anyway”).  Christopher Slobogin has described the tendency of an 
unyielding insistence on probable cause to lead to the exclusion of certain government actions from 
Fourth Amendment regulation altogether.  See generally Christopher Slobogin, The Liberal Assault on 
the Fourth Amendment, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 603 (2007).  Slobogin has been arguing against what 
he calls the “probable-cause-forever” approach to Fourth Amendment search doctrine, and in favor 
of what he calls “the proportionality principle,” since the 1990s.  See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, The 
World Without A Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1, 68 (1991). 
 81 On the fiction of “consent” in Fourth Amendment doctrine, see, for example, Tracey Maclin, The 
Good and Bad News About Consent Searches in the Supreme Court, 39 MCGEORGE L. REV. 27, 27–30 (2008) 
(noting the widely recognized “surreal quality about the Court’s consent search jurisprudence”); 
Tracey Maclin, “Black and Blue Encounters”: Some Preliminary Thoughts About Fourth Amendment Seizures: 
Should Race Matter?, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 243, 249–50 (1991); see also David K. Kessler, Free to Leave? 
An Empirical Look at the Fourth Amendment’s Seizure Standard, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 51, 53 
(2009) (emphasis omitted) (empirically demonstrating that actual people would not “feel free to 
terminate simple encounters with law enforcement officers” in two situations that “are similar to 
situations in which the Court has held that people would feel free to leave”). 
 82 Slobogin, supra note 80, at 605.  
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stop him,83 and to have reasonable suspicion that the stopped person “may 
be armed and presently dangerous” before frisking him,84 can be understood 
in part as a reflection of rising concerns in the late 1960s about the aggressive 
use of stop-and-frisk by police departments operating in minority 
communities.85  Terry attempted to refashion Fourth Amendment doctrine to 
address the troubling rise in the number of stops and frisks, and the prospect 
of further rises to come. 
 
 83 In fact, Terry does not use the phrase “reasonable suspicion.”  The Court focused its holding 
primarily on the propriety of Officer McFadden’s frisk, and even noted that “[w]e . . . decide 
nothing today concerning the constitutional propriety of an investigative ‘seizure’ upon less than 
probable cause for purposes of ‘detention’ and/or interrogation.”  Terry, 492 U.S. at 19 n.16; see 
also id. at 32–33 (Harlan, J., concurring) (noting a “logical corollar[y]” of the majority’s decision 
“that I do not think the Court has fully expressed,” namely that “the right to frisk in this case 
depends upon the reasonableness of a forcible stop to investigate a suspected crime”).  But future 
case law referred back to Terry’s language regarding a police officer who “reasonably . . . 
conclude[s] . . . that criminal activity may be afoot” as a formulation of the reasonable suspicion 
standard.  Terry, 492 U.S. at 30; see, e.g., United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 12 (1989) 
(characterizing Terry as holding that “the police can stop and briefly detain a person for investigative 
purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity 
‘may be afoot’”).  See generally LAFAVE, supra note 68, § 9.5(b) (surveying the development of the 
“reasonable suspicion” standard). 
 84 See Terry, 492 U.S. at 30.  For a more recent formulation, see Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 
326–27 (2009) (“[T]o proceed from a stop to a frisk, the police officer must reasonably suspect that 
the person stopped is armed and dangerous.”). 
 85 Terry refers to “[t]he wholesale harassment by certain elements of the police community, of which 
minority groups, particularly Negroes, frequently complain.”  Terry, 392 U.S. at 14.  As noted 
above, Terry also cited a presidential commission on the abuse of stop-and-frisk as a “major source 
of friction between the police and minority groups.”  Id. at 14 n.11.  Carol Steiker notes that as 
Chief Justice Warren wrote “Terry in the flashpoint year of 1968, [he] was exquisitely sensitive to 
the issue of racial discrimination in law enforcement,” and that Justice Brennan similarly expressed 
concern “[i]n his extensive correspondence with Warren over the drafting of Terry” about 
“unleashing police tactics that would ‘aggravate the already white heat resentment of ghetto 
Negroes against the police.’”  Steiker, supra note 79, at 349; see also Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts 
About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 841 (1994) (arguing that the Warren Court’s criminal 
procedure revolution, including its “focus on warrants, probable cause, and the exclusionary rule[,] 
was in some significant sense a response to the problems of racial discrimination that it . . . [was] 
forced to confront”).  But see Barrett, supra note 71, at 772 (noting evidence “that the Court wanted 
the stop and frisk cases to be understood generally as police, but not as race, cases,” including the 
fact that Terry does not mention any individual’s race, thus leaving the reader unaware that it was 
“a case where a white police officer saw two young black men on a public street, thought they 
looked suspicious, kept watching them, followed them, and ultimately questioned and frisked 
them”). 
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B. Police Bureaucratization and the Rise of Stop-and-Frisk 
As noted in the introduction, Part III will explore certain similarities 
between Terry’s revision of existing seizure doctrine and Carpenter’s revision of 
existing search doctrine, as well as considering how Carpenter might be 
extended to address the challenges of digital mass surveillance.  In order to 
understand the similarities between the two cases, it will be helpful to take a 
deeper look at the changing historical conditions that ultimately led to the 
concern about large-scale stop-and-frisk beginning in the early 1960s.  The 
argument in Part III will be that an analogous transformation is currently 
taking place in the realm of digital surveillance.  
The history of policing in the United States is in part a story of rising 
professionalization and bureaucratization.86  The standard account begins 
by noting that throughout the Colonial Era and until the mid-nineteenth 
century, there were no uniformed police forces.87  Instead, local communities 
tended to rely on three institutions whose origins lay in medieval England: a 
sheriff appointed at the county level, constables at the level of the town or 
city, and amateur watchmen who were drafted from the male citizenry and 
originally served mostly at night.88  As the legal historian Lawrence Friedman 
has stated, criminal law enforcement in colonial times was “a business of 
amateurs.”89  
 
 86 It might be argued that a tension exists between these two terms.  To belong to a “profession” 
generally implies a certain autonomy and independence of judgment, while “bureaucrats,” as 
discussed below, are sometimes conceived of as, ideally, interchangeable cogs.  But the contrast 
probably means less in practice than in theory, given that most positions, whether viewed as 
bureaucratic or professional or some combination of the two, require a balance of discretion and 
rule-following.  In any case, both terms contrast with the notion of the untrained amateur. 
 87 See Steiker, Second Thoughts, supra note 85, at 824 (describing “[t]he invention in the nineteenth 
century of armed, quasi-military, professional police forces, whose form, function, and daily 
presence differ dramatically from that of the colonial constabulary”).  William Stuntz called the rise 
of police forces “the great story of nineteenth-century criminal justice.”  William J. Stuntz, The 
Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393, 434 (1995). 
 88 See WALKER, THE POLICE IN AMERICA, supra note 67, at 2–5; Steiker, Second Thoughts, supra note 
85, at 830–32 (noting that the citizenry could also be called to assistance through the “hue and cry 
and the posse comitatus”). 
 89 Steiker, Second Thoughts, supra note 85, at 830 (quoting LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND 
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 27 (1993)); see also David Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 
UCLA L. REV. 1165, 1193–1229 (1999) (emphasizing the extent to which those responsible for law 
enforcement in earlier eras of Anglo-American criminal law—especially the response to crime, as 
opposed to its prevention—were not merely amateurs, but private actors). 
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In response to the rioting and disorder that accompanied urbanization, 
industrialization, and immigration in the 1830s and 1840s, the amateur 
model of policing foundered.90  Reformers looked to two models: slave 
patrols used in Southern communities to police the slave population, and the 
recently established London Metropolitan Police, created by then-Home 
Secretary Robert Peel in part based on the paramilitary “Peace Preservation 
Force” he had established in Ireland to control the restive population there.91  
Throughout the remainder of the nineteenth century, uniformed American 
police forces grew in size, and were increasingly expected to engage in 
investigation as well as peacekeeping; but they remained “completely 
unprofessional,” corrupt, and inefficient.92  Neighborhood politicians 
dispensed police jobs as a form of patronage, little training existed, brutality 
was rampant, and “police officers habitually evaded their responsibilities, 
spending much of their time in saloons and barbershops.”93 
 
 90 See WALKER, THE POLICE IN AMERICA, supra note 67, at 6. 
 91 Id. at 3–4; John F. McEldowny, Policing and the Administration of Justice in Nineteenth-Century Ireland, in 
POLICING WESTERN EUROPE: POLITICS, PROFESSIONALISM, AND PUBLIC ORDER, 1850–1940, 
at 18–19 (Clive Emsley & Barbara Weinberger eds., 1991); James W. E. Sheptycki, Police, in 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & SOCIETY: AMERICAN AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES (David S. Clark 
ed., 2007); see also STUNTZ, supra note 80, at 86 (noting that “urban police forces existed neither in 
eighteenth-century Britain—London’s metropolitan police force was founded in 1829, thanks to 
then-Home Secretary Robert Peel (hence the name given London’s officers: ‘bobbies’)—nor in the 
newly independent United States”); id. at 73 (“Local police forces arose in response to the first waves 
of European immigration in the 1840s and 1850s.”).  
An alternative, broader conception of “policing” had existed in continental Europe and especially 
Prussia and France, where Louis XIV first established a centralized office of police not only to 
regulate crime, but to administer all aspects of the health of the social body.  See Sheptycki, supra 
(noting that the office of police was responsible for maintaining political order through spying, as 
well as “diverse matters including firefighting, sanitation, street lighting, relief of the poor, care of 
the sick, inspection of weights and measures, securing and distributing the food supply, licensing of 
news publications and manufacturing enterprises, and many other functions crucial to the 
maintenance of a healthy population”); see also BERNARD E. HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION OF FREE 
MARKETS 2–8 (2011) (describing the manifold functions of ancien régime French police).  But this 
broader, continental model of policing may not have seemed a live option in the 1830s through the 
1850s in the United States, because Anglo-American observers had long viewed the more expansive 
and intrusive regulatory police states of Prussia and then Austria and France with suspicion.  See 
DAVID ALAN SKLANSKY, DEMOCRACY AND THE POLICE 16–17 (2008); WALKER, THE POLICE 
IN AMERICA, supra note 67, at 2.  But see Steiker, supra note 85, at 831 (noting that constables and 
night watchmen had certain responsibilities outside of peacekeeping and investigating, including 
“announcing marriages”). 
 92 See WALKER, THE POLICE IN AMERICA, supra note 67, at 7–10; Steiker, supra note 85, at 834. 
 93 WALKER, THE POLICE IN AMERICA, supra note 67, at 7–9; Steiker, supra note 85, at 834–35.  In 
William Stuntz’s revisionist account of the history of American crime and punishment, however, 
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Starting in the later nineteenth century, progressive reformers 
spearheaded a movement for police professionalism, sometimes arguing 
based on an analogy to the military that American police should be “engaged 
in a war on crime.”94  Progressive urban police chiefs such as August Vollmer 
attempted to centralize and reform police forces, narrow the police function, 
“protect the officers from political interference, keep them from temptation, 
place them under military discipline, and otherwise treat them like 
soldiers.”95  
A “second wave” of police professionalization began in the 1950s, this 
time led more by police administrators than by civic activists.96  Against the 
conventional wisdom at the time that police could do little to prevent crime, 
and thus should focus above all on reacting effectively to crime when it 
occurred,97 theorists of this second wave of professionalization such as 
 
the “grubby, politicized institutions” of policing and prosecution “functioned reasonably well 
(outside the South—an important qualification)” before the mid-twentieth century.  STUNTZ, supra 
note 80, at 68.  Steiker summarizes policing in the South: “[D]uring Reconstruction . . . the new 
police in the South, and to a lesser degree in the North as well, treated blacks and black communities 
with extraordinary harshness, while often ignoring, and sometimes actively encouraging, illegal 
white-on-black violence.”  Steiker, supra note 85, at 839 (footnotes omitted). 
 94 FOGELSON, supra note 66, at 54;  see also id. at 40–92 (recounting the rise of “the military analogy” 
in policing); WALKER, supra note 67, at 10; Steiker, supra note 85, at 836–37 (“[N]ineteenth-century 
police reformers turned to the military as a model for the organization of law enforcement.”).  By 
contrast, “[i]n the nineteenth century, the police had been distinctly unmilitaristic—sloppy, ill-
disciplined, poorly managed.”  WALKER, THE POLICE IN AMERICA, supra note 67, at 12.  But see 
Steiker, supra note 85, at 824, 833, 839 (suggesting that the uniformed, full-time “new police” that 
began to emerge after the 1830s were “quasi-military,” with “their uniforms, arms, and military 
drilling” inspired by “the early nineteenth-century ‘slave patrols’ organized by many Southern 
cities”).  It might be noted that the idea of the military as a paragon of discipline and efficient 
management is only somewhat older than the idea of uniformed, quasi-military police.  See, e.g., 
PAUL KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT POWERS 75 (1989) (describing the 
development of professional, bureaucratized standing armies in the eighteenth century).  No one 
would have described the marauding, pillaging mercenaries of the Thirty Years’ War, for example, 
as a model of rational organization.  See MICHAEL HOWARD, WAR IN EUROPEAN HISTORY 37 
(rev. ed. 2009).  The story of modernity has been, in part, the story of a rising culture of discipline 
across various social contexts and institutions.  See generally NORBERT ELIAS, THE CIVILIZING 
PROCESS (Eric Dunning et al. eds., Edmund Jephcott trans., rev. ed. 2000); MICHEL FOUCAULT, 
DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (Alan Sheridan trans., 1995) (1975); 
CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE (2007). 
 95 FOGELSON, supra note 66, at 75, 79, 84; WALKER, THE POLICE IN AMERICA, supra note 67, at 11. 
 96 FOGELSON, supra note 66, at 167–92; SKLANSKY, supra note 91, at 36. 
 97 See Huq, supra note 56, at 2413 n.84 (citing James J. Willis, A Recent History of the Police, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLICE AND POLICING 3, 6–7 (Michael D. Reisig & Robert J. Kane eds., 
2014); Lawrence W. Sherman, The Rise of Evidence-Based Policing: Targeting, Testing, and Tracking, 42 
CRIME & JUST. 377, 378 (2013). 
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Vollmer’s protégé O.W. Wilson “argued that police could deter criminal 
activity by increasing the likelihood that offenders would be caught or by 
reducing the opportunities for offenders to commit crime.”98  One tool of 
deterrent policing was to “seek out offenders rather than wait for victims to 
report crime,” for example through “the systematic use of field 
interrogation.”99 
The second wave of police professionalization also overlapped with a 
number of broader historical shifts affecting policing and criminal justice. 
Because prosecutors and judges in the United States tend to be elected at the 
county level, the great migration of southern African Americans to northern 
cities and the parallel flight of white city-dwellers to the suburbs resulted in 
white suburban voters exercising increasing power over criminal justice in 
minority urban communities.100  At the same time, the rate of violent crime 
exploded, with, for example, murder tripling between 1950 and 1972 in 
Chicago and quintupling in New York.101  The Warren Court’s criminal 
 
 98 Meares, supra note 56, at 166 (citing O.W. WILSON & ROY CLINTON MCLAREN, POLICE 
ADMINISTRATION 320–21 (4th ed. 1977)). 
 99 Meares, supra note 56, at 166, 166 n.42.  As Harmon and Manns note, the idea of “police-initiated 
or ‘proactive’ policing” can be found in scholarship as early as the late 1960s, but “did not develop 
fully or spread widely in its contemporary form until the 1980s and 1990s, after a series of reports 
in the 1970s and early 1980s”—including the famous Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment 
in 1972–1973—“raised serious doubts about the effectiveness of the traditional patrol model.”  
Harmon & Manns, supra note 64, at 55–56 (footnotes omitted); see also WALKER, THE POLICE IN 
AMERICA, supra note 67, at 23, 112–18.  It is not entirely clear how to reconcile the apparent 
prevalence of large-scale stop-and-frisk in the early 1960s, as reflected in, for example, the Kerner 
Commission Report, discussed supra Part II.A, with the history of policing persuasively summarized 
by Harmon and Manns, according to which proactive policing did not develop as a theory until the 
late 1960s, and as a practice until the 1980s and 1990s.  Compare Harmon & Manns, supra note 64, 
at 55–58, with Meares, supra note 56, at 178. 
 100 STUNTZ, supra note 80, at 7, 16, 35–36. 
 101 STUNTZ, supra note 80, at 5.  Although not mentioned by Stuntz, one explanation of the sudden 
rise in violent crime during this period, and its equally sudden fall beginning in the 1990s, is that 
children who were exposed to rising levels of gasoline lead in the decades after World War II went 
on to commit more violent crime, while children who were exposed to less lead after its use declined 
beginning in the 1970s went on to commit less violent crime.  See Kevin Drum, Lead: America’s Real 
Criminal Element, MOTHER JONES (Feb. 2013), https://www.motherjones.com/environment/2016
/02/lead-exposure-gasoline-crime-increase-children-health/ (summarizing the evidence for the 
lead-crime hypothesis, including one study that found “if you add a lag time of 23 years, lead 
emissions from automobiles explain 90 percent of the variation in violent crime in America”); Kevin 
Drum, An Updated Lead-Crime Roundup for 2018, MOTHER JONES (Feb. 1, 2018), 
https://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2018/02/an-updated-lead-crime-roundup-for-2018/ 
(collecting studies since 2012, including natural experiments such as Stephen B. Billings & Kevin 
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procedure rulings in the 1960s created “new public expectations about police 
performance,” just as the civil rights movement encouraged African 
Americans to be “less willing to suffer abuses at the hands of police.”102  “For 
many blacks, the cop on the street became the symbol . . . for a systematic 
pattern of racial discrimination in the United States.”103  When urban riots 
began breaking out in 1964, they were usually sparked by incidents involving 
the police.104 
Meanwhile, the bureaucratization of police forces continued its decades-
long march, driven forward by organizational ideas such as those contained 
in O.W. Wilson’s “enormously influential” treatise Police Administration, first 
published in 1950, whose “precepts trained an entire generation of police 
officials.”105  The push toward bureaucratic efficiency was facilitated by 
technological changes in police work, especially the two-way radio, which 
had entered common use in the late 1930s and facilitated supervisors’ ability 
to monitor whether patrol officers were in fact on duty, rather than 
shirking.106 
Indeed, bureaucratization itself can be viewed as a kind of technological 
development.  According to conventional theories of bureaucratization, a 
bureaucracy aims to standardize the behaviors of human beings so that their 
performance becomes as predictable, reliable, and adjustable as the 
behaviors of parts in a machine.107  Like the parts in a machine, the workers 
in a bureaucracy are meant to be interchangeable with replacements.108  
 
T. Schnepel, Life After Lead: Effects of Early Interventions for Children Exposed to Lead, 10 AM. ECON. J. 
315 (2018)). 
 102 WALKER, THE POLICE IN AMERICA, supra note 67, at 19–20. 
 103 Id. at 20. 
 104 Id. at 20. 
 105 Id. at 14. 
 106 See Id. at 13–14.  In addition, the increasing use of patrol cars reduced the amount of face-to-face 
contact between police and members of the community.  “By the 1950s most departments 
converted exclusively to motorized patrol.  Foot patrol remained common only in the densely 
populated cities of the Northeast.”  Id. at 13.  To be clear, programmatic stop-and-frisk is 
compatible with the use of patrol cars.  The police officer drives up to a pedestrian and then steps 
out of the vehicle to carry out the stop.  See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 
628 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 107 The general model of bureaucracy I have in mind is described in Gregory Brazeal, Bureaucracy and 
the U.S. Response to Mass Atrocity, 1 U. MIAMI NAT’L SEC. & ARMED CONFLICT L. REV. 57 (2010–
2011) (drawing in particular on GRAHAM ALLISON & PHILIP ZELIKOW, ESSENCE OF DECISION: 
EXPLAINING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS (2d ed. 1999)). 
 108 See, e.g., JAMES F. RICHARDSON, URBAN POLICE IN THE UNITED STATES 121 (1974) (noting that 
“[b]ureaucrats can be considered as interchangeable parts who fill certain slots in an organizational 
chart”). 
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That is, the outputs of any part of the bureaucratic machine should not 
depend on the variable, idiosyncratic, personal characteristics of the 
individual person who happens to be filling the role at any given time.  
Instead, the outputs are intended to be predictable based on the impersonal 
position that the worker fills in the bureaucracy—in other words, the person’s 
“office”  (hence “bureau-cracy,” or “rule by offices”).  The holder of each 
position is assigned to carry out various routine behaviors according to 
standard operating procedures, not entirely unlike the algorithms in a piece 
of software.  
If we think of bureaucracies as similar to machines, then we can see the 
bureaucratization of police forces in the mid-twentieth century as similar in 
some ways to the introduction of a new technology to policing.  Among other 
things, these new bureaucratic “machines” reduced the cost of implementing 
proactive policing policies, including the widespread use of stop-and-frisk.  If 
the leaders of a police department decided that officers should try to deter, 
prevent, and detect crime by engaging in more frequent street stops, 
bureaucratic organization made it easier to carry out the new objective.  The 
increased use of street stops could simply be introduced as an addition or 
adjustment to the standard operating procedures.109  
The process of introduction might begin with the issuing and 
dissemination of orders and training, accompanied by incentives for those 
who increase their stop activity and disincentives for those who do not.110  A 
bureaucratized police force will also likely have record-keeping systems in 
place that will facilitate monitoring how many stops and frisks officers are 
 
 109 As Judge Scheindlin suggested in the context of the NYPD’s stop-and-frisk training:  
NYPD officers are trained to carry out their duties according to a set of standard operating 
procedures.  The NYPD’s training reduces the unpredictable, confusing challenges that 
arise on patrol to a manageable set of standard situations and orderly procedures for 
addressing them. . . .  In this sense, the NYPD’s training follows the model of a traditional 
Western military academy, which aims “to reduce the conduct of war to a set of rules and 
a system of procedures—and thereby to make orderly and rational what is essentially 
chaotic and instinctive.”   
  Ligon v. City of New York, 925 F. Supp. 2d 478, 520–21 & n.305 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting JOHN 
KEEGAN, THE FACE OF BATTLE 18 (1976)). 
 110 Cf. Wilson & Boland, supra note 72, at 370–71 (noting that implementing a strategy of “aggressive 
patrol”—that is, “field interrogations or ‘street stops’”—requires a police executive to “recruit 
certain kinds of officers, train them in certain ways, and devise requirements and reward systems 
(traffic ticket quotas, field interrogation obligations, promotional opportunities) to encourage them 
to follow the intended strategy,” which Wilson notes “used to be . . . the core of the concept of 
‘police professionalism’”). 
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carrying out.  To the extent that the records are accurate, officers’ knowledge 
that their stops are being monitored will provide a further incentive to 
comply with the directive to carry out more stops.111 
It might have been assumed that the continuing bureaucratization of 
police forces in the 1950s and 1960s would lead to improved police-
community relations.  After all, if the police are doing their job more 
effectively, would it not follow that the community would benefit, and 
therefore be grateful?  But the Kerner Commission, which found “deep 
hostility between police and the ghetto communities” to be a “primary 
cause” of the recent urban riots,112 also found that “many of the serious 
disturbances took place in cities whose police are among the best led, best 
organized, best trained and most professional in the country.”113  How could 
it be that bureaucratization might lead to more, rather than less, conflict 
between the police and the community? 
Once we recognize that bureaucratization facilitated the implementation 
of programmatic stop-and-frisk, the puzzle disappears.  If the leaders of 
increasingly bureaucratized police forces used their enhanced control over 
police officers to expand the practice of proactive field interrogations and 
frisks, it is easy to see how bureaucratization and police-community conflict 
might be positively rather than negatively correlated.114  To decide that one 
of the jobs of the police is to stop, question, and frisk suspicious characters on 
a large scale, in a social context where police officers often associate young 
black men with crime, risks suggesting, in effect, that the job of the police is 
race-based harassment.115  The better the police do their job in such a setting, 
the more police-community hostility will likely result.  To the extent that 
 
 111 For an example of a highly developed bureaucratic stop-and-frisk program, see Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 
2d at 591–620 (describing the training, supervision, record-keeping, and incentives in the NYPD’s 
stop-and-frisk program). 
 112 WALKER, THE POLICE IN AMERICA, supra note 67, at 21 (quoting KERNER COMMISSION REPORT, 
supra note 67). 
 113 Id. 
 114 Cf. id. (noting that “[a]ggressive patrol—a style of policing that resulted in frequent police-citizen 
contacts—appeared to be a problem” that contributed to community hostility toward many of “the 
best led, best organized” police forces). 
 115 Cf. id. (“A frequent complaint voiced by minority spokespersons is that the police harass minority 
citizens, especially young males.  Harassment is usually defined as a greater tendency to stop, 
question, and frisk.”); Steiker, Second Thoughts, supra note 85, at 840 (noting the “deeply entrenched 
. . . widespread use by police of race as a proxy for criminality,” with the result that African 
Americans are “much more likely to be stopped, searched, and subjected to brutal treatment than 
similarly situated white people”). 
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bureaucratization enhances the ability of a police force to do whatever task 
is assigned to it, bureaucratization would thus increase rather than reduce 
police-community hostility. 
* * * 
The historical background of Terry recounted above illustrates how 
Fourth Amendment doctrine can respond when a practice that has not 
previously been identified as unconstitutional, and that might once even have 
been seen as too marginal to merit constitutional scrutiny, increases in 
frequency in such a way that it threatens to interfere with a significant 
constitutional interest.  Without rejecting the principle of nonaggregation 
and concluding that the increased frequency of the practice itself makes it 
unconstitutional, courts can respond to the novel constitutional threat by 
adjusting the doctrinal rules governing the practice.  In particular, courts can 
attempt to reduce the frequency of the practice by imposing costly 
procedural burdens on it, and can attempt to reduce the threat that the 
practice poses to constitutional interests by restricting its use to circumstances 
where it is reasonably justified.116 
Just as the bureaucratization of American policing had, by the early 
1960s, reduced the difficulty of carrying out large-scale programs of stop-
and-frisk, so in recent years the steadily falling costs and rising sophistication 
of digital technologies have facilitated the practice of mass surveillance.117  
Therefore, just as the increasing use of aggressive, large-scale stop-and-frisk 
called for a response from the Supreme Court in Terry, so today the 
increasing use of digital mass surveillance calls for the Supreme Court to 
 
 116 In fact, an increase in procedural burdens can by itself reduce the risk of unjustified police actions.  
See William J. Stuntz, Commentary, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth Amendment, 
114 HARV. L. REV. 842, 848 (2001) (noting that because “[w]arrants raise the costs of searching,” 
they “also raise the substantive standard applied to the search,” because “[i]f an officer knows he 
must spend several hours on the warrant, he is likely not to ask for it unless he is pretty sure he will 
find the evidence”). 
 117 For an attempt to quantify the relative costs of different methods of one form surveillance—location 
tracking—see Kevin S. Bankston & Ashkan Soltani, Tiny Constables and the Cost of Surveillance: Making 
Cents Out of United States v. Jones, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 335, 341–50 (2014).  Drawing on Orin 
Kerr’s “equilibrium-adjustment theory,” Bankston and Soltani propose that Fourth Amendment 
doctrine should “impose new legal costs” whenever “a new surveillance technique” makes it 
“extremely inexpensive for the government to collect information that otherwise would have been 
impossible or prohibitively costly to obtain.”  Id. at 350–51; see also Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-
Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476 (2011). 
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recognize the constitutional problems of digital mass search under the Fourth 
Amendment.  Part III proposes a doctrinal path for doing so. 
III. DIGITAL MASS SURVEILLANCE AFTER CARPENTER 
A. Carpenter as the Terry of Digital Search 
In 2018, the Supreme Court held in Carpenter v. United States that the 
Fourth Amendment generally requires the government to obtain a warrant 
based on probable cause in order to acquire seven days or more of a mobile 
phone number’s historical CSLI from a third-party wireless carrier.118  CSLI 
is generated “[e]ach time the phone connects to a cell site,”119 and “[w]ireless 
carriers collect and store CSLI for their own business purposes.”120  The 
Court’s opinion emphasizes that its holding is “narrow,”121 and as phrased 
in the preceding sentences, the holding might seem to be a minor technical 
clarification.  In fact, however, Carpenter is a momentous decision.  It is the 
first time that the Supreme Court has recognized an exception to the third-
party doctrine for digital data.  It opens the door to further limitations on the 
third-party doctrine in contexts where consumers “share” digital data with 
third parties, as consumers routinely do whenever they carry a cell phone, 
send a text message or email, log into a Wi-Fi network, use a web browser, 
participate in social media, store data in the cloud, or use an app that collects 
data concerning location, health, or other arguably private matters.122  
At first glance, Carpenter and Terry might seem to have very little in 
common other than being landmark Fourth Amendment decisions.  Carpenter 
deals with what it presents as a deeply invasive form of search using a digital 
technology, while Terry deals with what it presents as a minimally invasive 
form of seizure (a “stop”) and of search (a “frisk”).123  In terms of the ultimate 
values at stake in the Fourth Amendment, it might be argued that Carpenter, 
like many search cases, seems concerned above all with the protection of the 
 
 118 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214, 2217 n.3, 2220–21 (2018).  The Court 
emphasizes that the holding in Carpenter addresses the acquisition of historical CSLI for individual 
phone numbers, not “real-time CSLI or ‘tower dumps’ (a download of information on all the 
devices that connected to a particular cell site during a particular interval).”  Id. at 2220. 
 119 Id. at 2211. 
 120 Id. at 2212.  
 121 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220. 
 122 See supra Part I. 
 123 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); discussion supra note 83. 
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“privacies of life,”124 while the equivalent concern of Terry, as in many cases 
regarding the seizure of persons, might be seen as the protection of “the right 
to be let alone.”125  
In fact, if Carpenter and Terry are to be juxtaposed at all, it might seem that 
they should be placed in contrast.  Terry created a two-tiered system for the 
constitutional review of the seizure of persons, with the lower tier (“stops”) 
requiring only reasonable suspicion, and the upper tier (“arrests”) requiring 
probable cause.126  By contrast, Carpenter follows the standard rule for 
searches and requires the government to obtain a warrant based on probable 
cause in order to access historical CSLI records extending over a week or 
more.127  The decision implicitly rejects the constitutional sufficiency of the 
statutory scheme for obtaining CSLI records under the Stored 
Communications Act (“SCA”), a scheme that requires something resembling 
reasonable suspicion and that may in fact have been influenced by Terry.128 
 
 124 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2214 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)); see also Riley 
v. California, 573 U.S 373, 403 (2014) (quoting Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630) (noting that modern cell 
phones contain “the privacies of life”). 
 125 It is appropriate that Justice Douglas would have imposed a probable cause requirement even for 
street stops, see Terry, 392 U.S. at 35 (Douglas, J., dissenting), given his belief that “[t]he right to be 
let alone is . . . the beginning of all freedom.”  Pub. Utilities Comm’n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 467 
(1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting); cf. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, 
J., dissenting) (referring to “the right to be let alone” as “the most comprehensive of rights, and the 
right most valued by civilized men”), overruled by Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), and  Katz 
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Warren & Brandeis, supra note 59, at 195 (quoting THOMAS 
M. COOLEY, A TREATISE OF THE LAW OF TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888)) (referring to “the right ‘to be 
let alone’”). 
 126 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.  In 1979, the Supreme Court summarized what remains the prevailing 
view of Terry: 
Terry departed from traditional Fourth Amendment analysis in two respects.  First, it 
defined a special category of Fourth Amendment “seizures” so substantially less intrusive 
than arrests that the general rule requiring probable cause to make Fourth Amendment 
“seizures” reasonable could be replaced by a balancing test.  Second, the application of 
this balancing test led the Court to approve this narrowly defined less intrusive seizure on 
grounds less rigorous than probable cause, but only for the purpose of a pat-down for 
weapons. 
  Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 209–10 (1979).  
 127 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221. 
 128 The SCA states that in order for the government to obtain “a record or other information 
pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service (not including the contents of 
communications),” the government must first obtain a court order (“D order”) based on “specific 
and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that . . . the records or 
other information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”  18 
U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1) & (d) (2012); United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1202 (10th Cir. 2008) 
(stating that the SCA’s “‘specific and articulable facts’ standard derives from the Supreme Court’s 
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But closer inspection reveals similarities between the ways that Terry and 
Carpenter altered the landscape of previously existing Fourth Amendment 
doctrine, and the Court’s motivations for doing so.  As Part II argued, the 
increasing bureaucratization of police forces in the United States in the 
decades leading up to Terry facilitated the carrying out of street stops and 
frisks on a mass scale, which in turn created a threat to Fourth Amendment 
interests that would not have existed if street stops had been carried out 
exclusively on an ad hoc, infrequent basis.129  The Court in Terry responded 
by recognizing street stops as seizures that would be subject to Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness review.130  By transforming mass stops into mass 
 
decision in Terry”); see also Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212 (discussing prosecutors’ use of the SCA to 
acquire Timothy Carpenter’s CSLI).  But see Caminker, supra note 12, at 466–67 (noting that “the 
SCA’s ‘reasonable grounds to believe . . . relevant’ standard” may be “somewhat less stringent than 
the more commonplace ‘reasonable suspicion’ standard”). 
 129 See supra Part II. 
 130 See supra note 83.  To be clear, although the Supreme Court passed through a number of sometimes 
unclear positions on its way to the final decision in Terry, see generally Barrett, supra note 71, it would 
be inaccurate to suggest that Terry extended new Fourth Amendment protections to an area of police 
activity that had been previously assumed to lie outside the scope of the Fourth Amendment.  Non-
lawyers might not have understood that even a temporary detention by the police constituted a 
seizure under the common-law understanding of arrest.  See United States v. Bonanno, 180 F. Supp. 
71, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (“A layman, if asked if he had even been arrested, would not be likely to 
describe situations where he had been stopped by a police officer, or situations where his car had 
been stopped, or even situations where his questioning had been continued at a police station, as 
arrests.”); SEO, supra note 80, at 146–47, 308 n.68 (citing Bonanno, 180 F. Supp. 71).  But in the 
years leading up to Terry, it seems to have been generally assumed by courts, commentators, and 
legal practitioners that temporary detentions fell within the definition of seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment.  See LAFAVE, supra note 68, § 9.1 nn.3–4 (collecting scholarship and cases in the years 
leading up to Terry); SEO, supra note 80, at 142–55 (discussing police practices leading up to Terry).  
But see SEO, supra note 80, at 151 (suggesting that at least one presidential commission in the mid-
1960s feared the Warren Court might prohibit temporary detention, interrogations, and frisking 
without probable cause altogether).  The primary question was how to categorize such seizures in 
relation to existing doctrine, and whether such seizures must be based on probable cause, or 
something less—the latter possibility having been suggested by a number of statutes, judicial 
opinions, and scholarly articles before Terry.  See, e.g., Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 43–44 
(1968) (quoting reasonable suspicion standard for temporary, investigative detention in N.Y. CODE 
CRIM. PROC. § 180); WHITE & FRADELLA, supra note 64, at 36–38 (discussing wide variety in arrest 
practices in lead-up to Uniform Arrest Act).  See generally LAFAVE, supra note 68, § 9.1 nn.3–4 
(collecting scholarship and cases dealing with the application of the Fourth Amendment to seizures 
before Terry).  Even the pro-government amicus briefs submitted in Terry conceded that a limited, 
investigatory detention must be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.  See, e.g., Brief of the 
United States as Amicus Curiae at 5, Terry, 392 U.S. 1 (No. 67) (arguing that during a “limited 
detention in the course of a police investigation,” “[t]he Fourth Amendment does apply, to be sure, 
insofar as it guarantees the right of the people to be secure from unreasonable search and seizure 
of any kind”). 
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seizures, the Court brought under Fourth Amendment judicial scrutiny a 
growing practice that intuitively seemed to impinge on Fourth Amendment 
interests such as privacy and “the right to be let alone,” but that prior to Terry 
had never been addressed by the Court as a potential Fourth Amendment 
violation.131 
Similarly, the Court’s decision in Carpenter arose against a backdrop of 
extralegal change in which the reduced cost of digital surveillance, such as 
through the acquisition of third-party CSLI, resulted in the increased use of 
such surveillance by law enforcement, and the increased use in turn seemed 
to create a new threat to core Fourth Amendment privacy interests.  Chief 
Justice Roberts’ opinion explicitly presents the decision in part as a response 
to the falling costs and rising ease of surveillance using digital technologies.  
At the outset of a survey of the dangers to privacy posed by CSLI, the Court 
notes that “cell phone location information is . . . effortlessly compiled.”132  
Quoting Justice Alito’s concurrence in United States v. Jones, the Court 
emphasizes the relatively lower cost of digital as opposed to earlier forms of 
surveillance: 
Prior to the digital age, law enforcement might have pursued a suspect for a 
brief stretch, but doing so “for any extended period of time was difficult and 
costly and therefore rarely undertaken.”  For that reason, “society’s 
expectation has been that law enforcement agents and others would not—
and indeed, in the main, simply could not—secretly monitor and catalogue 
every single movement of an individual’s car for a very long period.”133 
In addition, and in line with this Article’s concerns regarding digital mass 
surveillance, the majority opinion in Carpenter gives weight to the fact that 
CSLI could be used to track “everyone” in the United States who carries a 
cell phone: “Critically, because location information is continually logged for 
all of the 400 million devices in the United States—not just those belonging 
to persons who might happen to come under investigation—this newfound 
tracking capacity runs against everyone.”134  It is a critical part of the Court’s 
reasoning that the digital surveillance technology at issue in the case has the 
 
 131 See LAFAVE, supra note 68, § 9.1 n.5 (noting that the Supreme Court had previously avoided 
confronting the status of temporary investigative detentions under the Fourth Amendment in Rios 
v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960), and Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959)). 
 132 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216. 
 133 Id. at 2217 (internal citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (Alito, 
J., concurring)). 
 134 Id. at 2218. 
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capacity to be used for mass surveillance, or at least for government “fishing 
expeditions through databases,” in the words of a recent scholarly analysis of 
Carpenter.135  The Court again highlights the significance of the risk of digital 
mass surveillance when it notes that “[t]he Government’s position fails to 
contend with the seismic shifts in digital technology that made possible the 
tracking of not only Carpenter’s location but also everyone else’s.”136  
In place of Justice Jackson’s invocation of an individual “Everyman” who 
is threatened with arbitrary search in the absence of Fourth Amendment 
protections,137 Chief Justice Roberts repeatedly invokes a mass “everyone” 
who could now be subjected to systematic, comprehensive surveillance in the 
absence of such protections.  Responding to Chief Justice Roberts’ language, 
and the Court’s stated wish in Carpenter “to place obstacles in the way of a too 
permeating police surveillance,”138 one scholar notes: 
Concerns over frequency do not typically play a role in determining 
whether an investigatory method constitutes an atomistically intrusive 
search.  But, in the end, I suspect such concerns are driving much of the 
distinction here between high- and low-tech surveillance methods for those 
justices who worry that the former “may ‘alter the relationship between 
citizen and government in a way that is inimical to democratic society.’”139 
In other words, Carpenter appears to be concerned with the likelihood that 
the lower cost of digital surveillance might increase not only the quantity of 
surveillance directed at a targeted individual such as Timothy Carpenter, but 
also the frequency of surveillance in the sense of the number of people subject 
 
 135 Freiwald & Smith, supra note 39, at 220.  Incidentally, another possible analogy between Carpenter 
and Terry is that critics of the decisions can point to a certain distance between the facts in the 
judicial record and the facts addressed by the Court.  Compare KERR, supra note 22, (describing how 
the Carpenter Court’s presentation of technological threats goes beyond, and even misrepresents, the 
record concerning the CSLI collected in Carpenter), with Lewis R. Katz, Terry v. Ohio at Thirty-Five: 
A Revisionist View, 74 MISS. L.J. 423, 430–32 (2004) (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (noting that 
Officer McFadden began observing the two black men in Terry simply because “they didn’t look right 
to me at the time,” noting that McFadden’s initial memory of the men’s subsequent suspicious behavior 
was that they looked in a shop window “about three times each,” and noting that McFadden later 
revised his estimate upward to perhaps five times each, but that Chief Justice Warren’s Terry opinion 
states the men “pace[d] alternately along an identical route, pausing to stare in the same store 
window roughly twenty-four times”). 
 136 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219 (emphasis added). 
 137 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 181 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“So a search against 
Brinegar’s car must be regarded as a search of the car of Everyman.”). 
 138 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2214 (quoting United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948)). 
 139 Caminker, supra note 12, at 457 (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring)). 
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to it.  The specter of digital mass surveillance casts a shadow over Carpenter,140 
not unlike the shadow cast over Terry by the perceived threat of the 
widespread, expanding use of stop-and-frisk.141  
Again, as we saw in Part II, Terry responded to the actual and potential 
increase in the frequency of street stops by defining the legal quality of those 
stops so as to bring them within the definition of “seizure” under the Fourth 
Amendment, thereby transforming the political problem of mass stops into 
the constitutional problem of mass seizures.  Carpenter carries out a similar 
transformation.  It responds to the actual and potential increase in the 
frequency of CSLI surveillance by altering the legal quality of CSLI 
surveillance to bring it within the definition of “search” under the Fourth 
Amendment, thereby transforming the political problem of digital mass 
surveillance, at least in the context of CSLI, into the constitutional problem 
of mass search.142  
In both cases, existing doctrine had failed to bring a government practice 
within the scope of judicial scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment, despite 
the growing threat that the practice seemed to pose to the underlying values 
of the Fourth Amendment.  In both cases, the Court addressed the arguable 
misalignment of doctrine and principle by clarifying how the problematic 
practice fell within the scope of a Fourth Amendment category (“seizure” 
and “search,” respectively). 
 
 140 “One can almost hear a background whisper of ‘Big Brother’ throughout the analysis.”  Id. 
 141 See supra Part II. 
 142 If we look back even further, another parallel might be found in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 
(1925), the Supreme Court’s first case on car searches.  SEO, supra note 80, at 116.  Although Carroll 
is primarily known as the origin of the “automobile exception” in Fourth Amendment doctrine, it 
also laid the foundation for Terry by turning from a categorical analysis of criminal procedure under 
the Fourth Amendment to an analysis based on reasonableness.  See id. at 138, 141.  Just as Terry 
involved a type of police encounter that was coercive, but not as coercive as a traditional arrest, 
and that seemed both practically necessary and impossible to carry out based on a requirement of 
probable cause; so Carroll involved a type of police encounter—the stopping and searching of a car 
for contraband—that was intrusive on privacy, but not as intrusive as a traditional search of a home, 
and that seemed both practically necessary (to the enforcement of prohibition) and impossible to 
carry out based on a warrant requirement.  See id. at 141–42, 148, 151.  Just as the Terry Court felt 
compelled to reach a decision in part based on the threatened proliferation of suspicionless stop-
and-frisk, so the Carroll court felt compelled to reach a decision in part based on the threatened 
proliferation of suspicionless vehicle stops: “It would be intolerable and unreasonable if a 
prohibition agent were authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of finding liquor, and 
thus subject all persons lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such a 
search.”  Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153–54. 
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B. Reasonable Suspicion for Digital Search After Carpenter  
Despite the underlying similarities between Carpenter and Terry described 
above, however, Carpenter departs from Terry in following the standard Fourth 
Amendment rule and requiring a warrant backed by probable cause in order 
for the government to carry out a search by collecting seven days or more of 
CSLI.143  This approach has puzzled some scholarly observers.144  After all, 
the Court in Carpenter had a very Terry-like doctrinal option ready at hand, a 
compromise between the absence of Fourth Amendment regulation and 
requiring a warrant backed by probable cause.  It could have shown 
deference to Congress and required something like the SCA’s “specific and 
articulable facts”145 requirement for the production of CSLI, a standard that 
bears some similarity to, although it may be somewhat weaker than, the 
“reasonable suspicion” standard for Terry stops.146  Alternatively, the Court 
could have remanded the case to the district court to consider an appropriate 
evidentiary standard.  Instead, without any explanation, the Court 
announced that CSLI records require a warrant,147 and ended the potential 
common-law-constitutional conversation before it could begin.  
At the same time, the Court in Carpenter did not close the door to the use 
of a reasonable suspicion standard in the context of digital surveillance, or 
even in the context of CSLI.  Indeed, the Court arguably left a conspicuous 
door open to the development of such a rule.  In a footnote, the majority 
opinion states:  
[W]e need not decide whether there is a limited period for which the 
Government may obtain an individual’s historical CSLI free from Fourth 
Amendment scrutiny, and if so, how long that period might be.  It is 
 
 143 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 n.3, 2221. 
 144 See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 12, at 463–67 (noting that “the Carpenter Court wasted no words—
literally zero—rejecting” the possibility of a mid-level reasonableness standard such as “reasonable 
suspicion”); Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Fourth Amendment Reasonableness After Carpenter, 128 YALE L.J. 
FORUM 943, 946 (2019). 
 145 See supra note 39. 
 146 See id. 
 147 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221 (“Before compelling a wireless carrier to turn over a subscriber’s CSLI, 
the Government’s obligation is a familiar one—get a warrant.”).  The phrasing echoes Chief Justice 
Roberts’ opinion for the Court in Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014) (“Our answer to the 
question of what police must do before searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest is 
accordingly simple—get a warrant.”). 
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sufficient for our purposes today to hold that accessing seven days of 
CSLI constitutes a Fourth Amendment search.148   
Justice Kennedy’s dissent suggests that the Court is creating a bright line such 
that at day seven, a “constitutional framework” enters into action.149  But the 
majority’s footnote rejects any implication that Carpenter holds the Fourth 
Amendment does not apply to historical CSLI records lasting shorter than 
seven days.  Of course, the majority also does not hold that the Fourth 
Amendment does apply.  It would be logically consistent for a future court to 
hold that accessing historical CSLI records lasting less than seven days is not 
a Fourth Amendment search and is subject to no constitutional constraints.  
After Carpenter has gone to such lengths to emphasize the gravity of the 
invasion of privacy resulting from seven days or more of CSLI records, 
however, it would seem more consistent for a future court to hold that 
accessing CSLI records of less than seven days intrudes sufficiently upon the 
Fourth Amendment interest in privacy to constitute a Fourth Amendment 
search, but one requiring reasonable suspicion that the records will reveal 
evidence of a crime, rather than probable cause.150  Requiring reasonable 
suspicion to access short-term CSLI records, rather than allowing unfettered 
government discretion or requiring a warrant, would have the added benefit 
of bringing these lesser privacy intrusions more closely into alignment with 
Congress’s “specific and articulable facts” evidentiary standard under the 
SCA.151 
In fact, future courts might interpret Carpenter as inviting the development 
of a more general two-tiered system of Fourth Amendment standards for 
digital search.  Such an approach would be consistent not only with Carpenter 
itself, but with the Supreme Court’s general application of mosaic theory in 
 
 148 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 n.3. 
 149 Cf. id. at 2233 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 150 On the other hand, a case could be made for treating the collection of CSLI records extending over 
a sufficiently brief period—say, an hour, or several hours—as not constituting a Fourth Amendment 
search at all.  This would allow law enforcement agents to perform “tower dumps,” that is, “a 
download of information on all the devices that connected to a particular cell site during a particular 
interval.”  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220, 2233.  Because short-duration tower dumps can be very 
useful in criminal investigations, and collect relatively little private information about any 
individual, it seems unlikely that courts would adopt an approach to the Fourth Amendment that 
effectively prohibits them. 
 151 See discussion supra note 128. 
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digital search cases.152  The Court appears increasingly willing to recognize 
the common-sense proposition that the threat to Fourth Amendment privacy 
interests posed by the government obtaining digital data depends in part on 
the quantity of potentially intimate data it obtains.  
Once the legitimacy of applying the aggregative reasoning of the mosaic 
theory to digital search is accepted, it follows naturally that more than one 
tier of scrutiny might be appropriate for the review of digital searches.  With 
regard not only to the collection of CSLI but to any number of methods of 
obtaining privacy-intrusive digital data, it is reasonable to distinguish 
between the acquisition of a lesser quantity of data that would likely result in 
lesser privacy harms and for which a lesser evidentiary standard might be 
appropriate, and a greater acquisition likely resulting in greater privacy 
harms and for which a greater evidentiary standard should be required.153 
 
 152 See infra Part IV; Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2215 (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 
(2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring)) (“[Five] concurring Justices [in 
Jones] concluded that ‘longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on 
expectations of privacy’—regardless whether those movements were disclosed to the public at 
large.”).  Although Riley dealt with the constitutionality of a search incident to arrest, rather than 
with the definition of a search, its treatment of the privacy interest in the digital data stored on a 
cellphone echoes the quantity-focused definition of digital search in the Jones concurrences and in 
Carpenter.  See Riley, 573 U.S. at 393 (drawing legal significance from the fact that “[c]ell phones 
differ in both a quantitative and a qualitative sense from other objects that might be kept on an 
arrestee’s person”). 
 153 It might be objected that the Supreme Court foreclosed the use of a two-tiered, Terry-like approach 
to search in Arizona v. Hicks, where the Court held that a police officer conducted a search in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment when he moved a turntable to read its serial number based on 
a reasonable suspicion that the turntable was stolen, but without probable cause.  480 U.S. 321, 
323, 326–27 (1987); see also id. at 333, 338 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 24–
25) (arguing that “the balance of the governmental and privacy interests strongly supports a 
reasonable-suspicion standard for the cursory examination of items in plain view”).  But Hicks was 
narrowly addressing the logic of the “plain view” doctrine, an exception to the warrant 
requirement.  Id. at 325–27.  The decision is driven by a concern to keep the plain view exception 
within tight limits, to ensure “that ‘the “plain view” doctrine may not be used to extend a general 
exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges.’”  Id. 
at 328 (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971)).  Just because the Supreme 
Court wanted to keep the plain view exception within tight limits does not imply that the Court has 
foreclosed the possibility of a two-tiered approach to search in all contexts.  
In fact, Hicks suggests that unless there is a reason to distinguish the two, the degree of justification 
required for a search should generally be the same as the degree of justification required for a 
seizure.  See id. at 328 (“[N]either [a search] nor [a seizure] is of inferior worth or necessarily requires 
only lesser protection.  We have not elsewhere drawn a categorical distinction between the two 
insofar as concerns the degree of justification needed to establish the reasonableness of police action 
. . . .”).  In light of this baseline, the fact that the Court has already recognized two tiers of 
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If CSLI can reveal a person’s “familial, political, professional, religious, 
and sexual associations” by “follow[ing] its owner beyond public 
thoroughfares and into private residences, doctor’s offices, political 
headquarters, and other potentially revealing locales,”154 a list of a person’s 
email or social media contacts could surely do the same.  The records of a 
person’s website visits, especially if they revealed search terms entered on 
websites, could reveal even more intimate details.  With regard to each of 
these forms of digital metadata, the aggregative reasoning underlying the 
mosaic theory would be consistent with drawing some temporal or other 
quantitative line above which probable cause would be required, but below 
which the government could obtain records based only on reasonable 
suspicion.  
For example, the Fourth Amendment could be interpreted to allow the 
government to obtain up to a day’s, or a week’s, worth of a person’s browsing 
history from an Internet service provider based on a reasonable suspicion 
that the records would reveal evidence of a crime.155  Access beyond that 
temporal line, wherever it is drawn, would require probable cause.  On the 
one hand, requiring probable cause to obtain a brief period of records could 
make it too difficult, if not practically impossible, to investigate certain 
crimes, such as child pornography and online terrorist recruiting.156  On the 
other hand, interpreting the Fourth Amendment to allow the government 
 
justification in the context of seizure argues in favor of recognizing two tiers in the context of search.  
It might also be noted that the Court has already applied a “reasonable suspicion” test to a search 
for criminal evidence in at least one context, see United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121 (2001) 
(searching a probationer’s home), and has recognized that digital technology sometimes creates 
unique threats to privacy that require departing from traditional Fourth Amendment search 
doctrine.  See Riley, 573 U.S. at 386; Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2222 (“When confronting new concerns 
wrought by digital technology, this Court has been careful not to uncritically extend existing 
precedents.”).  For further discussion of the Supreme Court’s “special needs” cases, see Part III.C 
below. 
 154 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217–18 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 
U.S. 400, 415 (2012)). 
 155 The precise temporal line would of course be a matter for debate based on differing estimations of 
the importance of privacy and law enforcement needs.  The point of this Section’s argument is not 
to determine the appropriate boundary lines between the two tiers of Fourth Amendment scrutiny 
for digital search, but rather to suggest that the aggregative reasoning at work in the mosaic theory 
fits comfortably with a two-tiered approach. 
 156 See Caminker, supra note 12, at 440–41 & n.165 (“Requiring a warrant for short-term CSLI 
monitoring might hinder criminal investigations much more severely than requiring a warrant only 
for long-term monitoring.”). 
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entirely unfettered discretion to collect even brief periods of such potentially 
private records would needlessly weaken constitutional privacy protections. 
Similar reasoning could potentially be applied to any category of digital 
data that the government might seek to obtain from a third party in the 
course of a criminal investigation.  Accessing some types of data that are 
especially likely to reveal private information, such as the contents of files 
stored in the cloud, might be held always to require a warrant, regardless of 
the quantity of information obtained—as is currently the case for the 
contents of emails.157  But for digital data that is relatively less likely to reveal 
intimacies when accessed in very limited quantities, like location data from a 
cell phone or vehicle, web browsing histories, digital communications 
metadata, or metadata from smart-home devices, a two-tiered approach 
based on reasonableness could provide the optimal balance between the 
protection of privacy and the practical needs of law enforcement 
investigations. 
The third-party doctrine itself would pose no hurdle to a two-tiered 
approach to Fourth Amendment digital search doctrine.  With regard to any 
category of digital data held by a third party, courts could evaluate whether 
the person who transmitted the data to the third party meaningfully chose to 
do so.158  Where she did not, the Court could follow Carpenter and “decline to 
extend” the third-party doctrine to the category of digital data in question.159  
 
 157 See supra note 39 (discussing Ex parte Jackson and Warshak’s protection of the contents of 
communications). 
 158 Cf. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979)) (“[I]n no 
meaningful sense does the user [of a cell phone] voluntarily ‘assume[ ] the risk’ of turning over a 
comprehensive dossier of his physical movements.”).  If a court were interested in protecting the 
privacy of some type of digital data, it is hard to imagine many contexts in which this line of 
reasoning could not be applied. 
 159 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217.  Now that Carpenter has introduced the possibility of cabining the reach 
of the third-party doctrine with regard to digital data, future courts might also consider limiting the 
reach of Miller and Smith even with regard to financial and phone call records, the respective subject 
matters of those cases.  See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976); Smith, 442 U.S. 735.  Kerr 
has proposed that the reasoning of Carpenter should lead to the conclusion that the collection of 
email metadata constitutes a search, but the collection of telephone metadata does not, because 
“[t]he digital age has not substantially changed [the] nature” of the latter.  See KERR, supra note 22.  
In terms of the underlying interests protected by the Fourth Amendment, however, it is difficult to 
see why a distinction should be drawn between the bulk collection of phone records using digital 
technology and the bulk collection of email records using the same.  An alternative approach would 
be to take even more seriously Carpenter’s emphasis on the difference that digital technology can 
make, and to conclude that when the government acquires phone call and financial records using 
digital technology, the third-party doctrine does not apply.  Of course, the government could in theory 
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The collection of such data, perhaps beyond some de minimis amount, would 
then constitute a search, and would be subject to either the warrant or the 
two-tiered reasonableness requirement discussed above. 
Establishing a two-tiered system of Fourth Amendment standards for 
digital search would bring digital search doctrine in line with the doctrine 
governing the seizure of persons since Terry.  Indeed, the case for a two-tiered 
digital search doctrine is arguably even stronger than the case for a two-tiered 
doctrine governing the seizure of persons.  The burdens to law enforcement 
of requiring probable cause every time the government seeks to obtain digital 
data from third parties are obvious and significant.160  The risks to privacy of 
allowing the government unfettered discretion under the Fourth 
Amendment to access digital data held by third parties, even if the contents 
of communications are excluded, are equally obvious and significant.161 
More importantly, while it is perhaps possible to imagine a counterfactual 
history in which Justice Douglas’s dissenting position in Terry prevailed, and 
the Supreme Court required probable cause even for temporary 
detentions,162 such an outcome is simply not plausible in the context of digital 
search.  There is no realistic scenario in which courts in the United States 
will abruptly reverse position and decide that all of our intuitively private 
digital information held by third parties, such as web browsing histories, 
phone and text message metadata, and location data collected by 
smartphone apps, can only be obtained by the government through warrants 
backed by probable cause, even if this means that a variety of serious crimes 
can no longer be effectively investigated and prosecuted.  The realistic 
choice, as suggested in the Introduction,163 is between subjecting such 
government data collection to judicial scrutiny based on a standard less than 
 
evade this requirement by collecting massive quantities of printed records and then scanning them 
into a searchable format.  But in light of the cost and inconvenience, it seems unlikely that the 
government would choose to do so, especially if it could obtain the records digitally based on a 
showing of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment. 
 160 See Bambauer, supra note 33, at 215 (“Most scholars know that recognizing access to third-party 
records as a full-fledged search requiring a warrant and probable cause is an unworkable solution 
[because] . . . keeping every last third-party record off limits until the case progresses to probable 
cause would unacceptably frustrate investigations.”).  
 161 See, e.g., Donohue, supra note 22, at 884 (discussing the consequences of bulk metadata collection by 
the government). 
 162 See supra text accompanying notes 78–80 (discussing Justice Douglas’s position and its likely 
consequences). 
 163 See supra Introduction. 
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probable cause, or not subjecting such collection to judicial scrutiny under 
the Fourth Amendment at all. 
All of the preceding analysis, like Carpenter and most Fourth Amendment 
case law, applies to government requests for digital data in the course of 
investigations involving specific, targeted individuals suspected of crimes.  
But as noted in the Introduction, the ultimate aim of this Article is to arrive 
at a plausible Fourth Amendment doctrine for governing the digital 
surveillance of large populations.  What relevance might a two-tiered Fourth 
Amendment doctrine for digital search have for digital mass surveillance? 
C. A Lidster for Digital Mass Search? 
Let us assume that there are at least some contexts in which courts might 
wish, or might even feel compelled, to uphold the constitutionality of the bulk 
collection of Americans’ intuitively private digital records, whether held by 
third parties or not.  The Introduction proposed a hypothetical scenario 
involving a surveillance program that a court perceives as vital to public 
safety, but that happens to collect a large number of Americans’ private 
digital records without any basis in individualized reasonable suspicion.164  
It is worth noting at the outset that if the surveillance program had 
focused on foreign intelligence, and had only incidentally collected Americans’ 
data, then it is possible that a court could have upheld the program by 
carving out an exception to the Fourth Amendment for surveillance 
programs whose primary purpose is foreign intelligence.  Although the law 
is unsettled on this point, the Supreme Court in Carpenter gestured toward the 
possibility of special rules governing the application of the Fourth 
Amendment to the products of foreign intelligence surveillance, or perhaps 
even programs related to national security in general.165  A future court may 
 
 164 See supra Introduction. 
 165 “[O]ur opinion does not consider other collection techniques involving foreign affairs or national 
security.”  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220; see also United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 
297, 308 (1972) (reserving judgment “on the scope of the President’s surveillance power with respect 
to the activities of foreign powers, within or without this country”).  Laura Donohue notes that the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (“FISCR”) recently “asserted, for the first time, 
a foreign intelligence surveillance exception to the Fourth Amendment,” and that the government 
has since cited the FISCR’s opinion in a white paper as support for “an exception to the Fourth 
Amendment warrant requirement.”  DONOHUE, supra note 52, at 146 (emphasis omitted) 
(discussing In re Directives [REDACTED] Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1009–10 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008)).  Donohue, like Solove and others, 
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determine that national security is a “special need,” distinct from ordinary 
criminal law enforcement, and that courts should develop different Fourth 
Amendment rules to govern surveillance programs whose primary purpose 
is national security, just as courts have developed different Fourth 
Amendment rules to govern safety inspections of homes,166 administrative 
inspections of businesses,167 the searching and drug testing of students,168 
border searches,169 and so on.170  In these “special needs” cases, the Supreme 
Court has carried out a Terry-like balancing of all the relevant interests to 
determine “the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the 
search.”171 
 
generally favors a distinction between a set of surveillance rules for ordinary criminal law 
enforcement purposes and a set of less restrictive rules for foreign intelligence, espionage, or 
national security purposes—combined with vigilance toward limiting the ever-expanding reach of 
“national security” as a category.  See id. at 145–46, 150–54, 159; SOLOVE, supra note 4, at 62–80.  
The aim in this Section is to offer a way to uphold a reasonable digital mass surveillance program—
if such a thing can exist—without distorting the protections provided by the Fourth Amendment 
more generally, even where the primary purpose of the program is not the protection of national 
security.  For this Article’s purposes, it is not necessary to resolve the normative question of whether 
a digital mass surveillance program ever could be reasonable, in the sense of satisfying some all-
things-considered balancing test or proportionality analysis.  The point is that if a court is already 
inclined to uphold such a program, it would be better for civil liberties, all other things being equal, for 
the court to do so through a Lidster-like analysis than through holding that the surveillance in 
question did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search at all, because the latter approach would 
allow the police and other state actors to collect the type of digital information at issue in all 
contexts, even where it would not be reasonable to do so. 
 166 See Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967) (requiring a search warrant for home safety 
inspections, in the absence of exigency or consent, but requiring only that the warrant be based on 
“reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an area inspection . . . with 
respect to a particular dwelling,” rather than probable cause). 
 167 See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972) (upholding warrantless inspection of a heavily 
regulated business); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 542 (1967) (applying Camara analysis to 
inspections of commercial structures). 
 168 See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 665 (1995) (upholding suspicionless drug-testing 
of high school student athletes “in furtherance of the government’s responsibilities, under a public 
school system, as guardian and tutor of children entrusted to its care”); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 
U.S. 325, 340–42 (1985) (upholding warrantless search of a student’s handbag based on reasonable 
suspicion that it contained cigarettes and the special need of maintaining school discipline). 
 169 See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538, 541 (1985) (requiring only 
reasonable suspicion of smuggling contraband for “the detention of a traveler at the border, beyond 
the scope of a routine customs search and inspection,” and reaffirming that routine border searches 
“are not subject to any requirement of reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or warrant”). 
 170 For a summary of the Supreme Court’s “special needs” cases, and analysis of their lack of clarity, 
see Slobogin, supra note 21, at 1726–33 (noting that the Court’s “focus on whether evidence of 
ordinary criminal wrongdoing is the goal leaves much to be desired”). 
 171 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341. 
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But let us focus here on the hardest case: a domestic digital mass 
surveillance program that a court (rightly or wrongly) believes to be vital to 
public safety, that involves the suspicionless collection of intuitively private 
digital information, and that is focused on collecting evidence for ordinary 
criminal law enforcement purposes.  Let us assume that the court is unwilling 
to finesse the issue by holding that the purpose of the program is not really 
criminal law enforcement, but rather some more general, non-punitive, 
safety-related goal.172  Is there a way for the court to hold the program 
constitutional under the Fourth Amendment without also holding that the 
government has unfettered discretion outside of the program to conduct the type 
of surveillance carried out in the program?  In other words, is there a way to 
quarantine the court’s upholding of the constitutionality of the collection of 
private information in the program so as not to contaminate or distort the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment in general?  Can a precedent be found 
in Fourth Amendment law for allowing suspicionless searches within some 
program while continuing to require a higher evidentiary standard for 
searches outside of the program? 
Once again, a solution can be found by turning from the law of search to 
the law of seizure.  As one treatise notes: 
The Court has permitted searches on less than probable cause in only three 
circumstances: 1) a search for weapons and dangerous people, not evidence, 
made for purposes of self-protection (Terry); 2) a search for evidence, where 
there are special needs beyond mere law enforcement; and 3) in certain 
circumstances, a search of a probationer’s residence (Knights).173 
None of these exceptions apply to our hypothetical program of domestic 
digital mass surveillance, assuming (again) that the court is unwilling to 
obscure the program’s actual law enforcement purposes.  Thus, there 
appears to be no precedent under Fourth Amendment search law for 
upholding the program.  A court that is strongly predisposed to uphold the 
 
 172 The Court in Edmond claimed that “each of the checkpoint programs that we have approved was 
designed primarily to serve purposes closely related to the problems of policing the border or the 
necessity of ensuring roadway safety,” and that “the constitutional defect of the program [in 
Edmond] is that its primary purpose is to advance the general interest in crime control.”  City of 
Indianapolis  v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41, 44 n.1 (2000); cf. id. at 50 & n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) 
(noting that it is “not at all obvious” “that the checkpoints at issue in Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz were 
not primarily related to criminal law enforcement”). 
 173 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., BASIC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 242 (7th ed. 2017). 
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program may, as a result, hold that the collection of private data in the 
program is not a search governed by the Fourth Amendment at all. 
But once we turn to the Fourth Amendment law of seizure, a precedent 
exists that will allow the court to uphold the program in question without 
removing the type of surveillance at issue from all Fourth Amendment 
regulation by concluding it does not constitute a search.  In Illinois v. Lidster, 
the Supreme Court upheld a highway checkpoint that had ordinary criminal 
investigation as its purpose.174  In Lidster, “an unknown motorist traveling 
eastbound on a highway in Lombard, Illinois, struck and killed a 70-year-old 
bicyclist.”175  “About one week later at about the same time of night and at 
about the same place, local police set up a highway checkpoint designed to 
obtain more information about the accident from the motoring public.”176  
The police conducted brief stops “not to determine whether a vehicle’s 
occupants were committing a crime, but to ask vehicle occupants, as 
members of the public, for their help in providing information about a crime 
in all likelihood committed by others.”177  The Court acknowledged that the 
vehicle stops constituted seizures under the Fourth Amendment,178 and that 
the seizures were not based on “individualized suspicion,”179 but nevertheless 
held the checkpoint program constitutionally reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment, based on the balancing of “‘the gravity of the public concerns 
served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public 
interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty.’”180  
It might seem dangerous to raise the possibility of adapting the reasoning 
of Lidster to a digital mass surveillance program.  After all, Lidster upholds the 
constitutionality of mass, suspicionless intrusions on Fourth Amendment 
privacy.181  But if we begin from the premise that a court is inclined to uphold 
 
 174 540 U.S. 419, 427–28 (2004).  
 175 Id. at 422. 
 176 Id.   
 177 Id. at 423. 
 178 Id. at 425–26. 
 179 Id. at 424–25. 
 180 Id. at 427 (quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979)).  
 181 There is a troubling asymmetry in the Supreme Court’s use of programmatic review in Fourth 
Amendment “special needs” cases, and in Lidster.  The Court is willing to step back from an 
individual government act that would be unconstitutional if viewed as an individual transaction, 
under ordinary Fourth Amendment doctrine, and uphold the act as part of a program if the 
program overall is constitutionally reasonable, under a “special needs” analysis.  But the Court is 
apparently unwilling, ever, to step back from an individual government act that would be 
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a digital mass surveillance program because the court finds it reasonable, 
then the Lidster approach may be the best way of limiting the damage—or 
preventing any damage, depending on one’s perspective.  The Court in 
Lidster could have concluded that the stops in question were too brief and 
uncoercive to be seizures, or could have adopted a fiction whereby the stops 
were not seizures at all because they were in fact consensual encounters.  
Similarly, a court confronted with a Fourth Amendment challenge to one of 
the many digital mass surveillance programs that the U.S. government may 
be carrying out at the moment, with largely unknown effects on Americans’ 
privacy,182 could follow the lead of the FISC in In re F.B.I. and conclude that 
the type of surveillance at issue in the program does not constitute a Fourth 
Amendment search.183  The effect of such an approach in Lidster would have 
been to free the police to set up similar vehicle checkpoints at any time and 
place across the country, and to allow the police to conduct brief, ostensibly 
uncoercive stops there without any basis at all, immune from any judicial 
scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment.  The police could have begun 
establishing these checkpoints throughout the country, or—even more 
troublingly—at the boundaries of every “high crime area.”  Similarly, the 
effect of such an approach in a digital mass surveillance case would be to free 
the government to conduct a type of digital surveillance with unfettered 
discretion.  Not only could the government collect the information at issue 
through bulk collection, but local police could collect it about any person that 
happens to provoke their suspicion.  
In both contexts, civil liberties are far better protected by allowing the 
program of searches or seizures lacking individualized suspicion to proceed, 
if a court finds the program constitutionally reasonable, while continuing to 
recognize that the searches or seizures are searches or seizures, and require 
evidentiary justification outside the special context of the program. 
Again, it may be that no program of domestic digital mass searches for 
ordinary law enforcement purposes should ever be held constitutionally 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.  Perhaps any threats serious 
 
constitutional if viewed as an individual transaction, under ordinary Fourth Amendment doctrine, 
and strike down the act as part of a program if the program overall is constitutionally unreasonable.  
If the latter form of analysis existed in Fourth Amendment law, it would allow courts to address the 
problematic implications of vast increases in frequency more directly—rather than having to 
accommodate concerns about frequency indirectly, as the Court arguably did in Terry and Carpenter. 
 182 See Slobogin, Policing, Databases, and Surveillance, supra note 22, at 76–78.  
 183 See In re F.B.I., No. BR 13-109, 2013 WL 5741573, at *5, *9 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013).  
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enough to justify suspicionless digital searches should be identified as “special 
needs” and therefore distinguished from ordinary law enforcement.  Indeed, 
if the hypothetical digital mass surveillance program we have been 
considering has as its primary purpose the identification of criminals from 
among the subjects of its digital searches, then it is distinguishable from the program 
in Lidster, where “[t]he police expected the information elicited to help them 
apprehend, not the vehicle’s occupants”—that is, the subjects of the privacy 
intrusion—“but other individuals.”184  
But there is another type of digital mass surveillance program that would 
be more closely analogous to the checkpoint in Lidster.  As Caminker notes, 
“proactive efforts to identify and thwart potential acts of terrorism require 
lots of background location and movement data from which computer 
algorithms can predict conventional behavior in order to discern 
unconventional and perhaps threatening aberrations.”185  If a generally 
privacy-protective judge were confronted with a challenge to a program of 
suspicionless digital mass searches that collected intuitively private 
information, but only as “background data,” and did so in what the judge 
believed to be a constitutionally reasonable manner under the Fourth 
Amendment, then Lidster’s approach would provide a quite analogous 
precedent allowing the judge to uphold the program without distorting the 
Fourth Amendment generally to accommodate the suspicionless searches in 
the program. 
An added benefit of the programmatic review of digital mass surveillance 
programs, based on Lidster or another “special needs” approach, is that such 
review could provide a basis for ordering injunctive relief including not only 
the termination of digital mass surveillance programs, but also more finely 
tuned remedies aimed at ensuring the reasonableness of the programs going 
forward.  Remedial orders could be a vehicle for implementing various 
sensible proposals that currently have no foothold in Fourth Amendment 
doctrine.  To take one example, scholars who criticize current Fourth 
Amendment digital search doctrine have sometimes suggested that the 
Fourth Amendment should be interpreted to regulate not only the collection 
of private digital data, but the querying (or other use) of such data.186  
 
 184 540 U.S. at 423. 
 185 Caminker, supra note 12, at 465–66. 
 186 See, e.g., Berman, supra note 30, at 578–79; Donohue, supra note 21, at 558; Krent, supra note 52, at 
53. 
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Currently, Fourth Amendment doctrine imposes no regulations on the 
government’s use of data once it has collected it.187  But even if courts 
continue to refuse to recognize any restrictions on querying under the Fourth 
Amendment, query restrictions could conceivably play a role in an equitable 
remedy regarding a digital mass surveillance program that is constitutionally 
unreasonable as currently constituted.  
A number of scholars have noted that changes in technology argue in 
favor of applying the more flexible tools of administrative law to the 
regulation of digital surveillance, as opposed to relying exclusively on the 
slow-moving and informationally limited process of constitutional 
adjudication.188  A remedial order directed at bringing a program of digital 
mass surveillance into line with the Fourth Amendment requirement of 
reasonableness could conceivably involve the establishment of institutions 
and procedures familiar from administrative law, perhaps even including the 
requirement that a municipal police department follow a notice-and-
comment procedure before deploying or expanding the use of a digital 
surveillance technology.189 
IV. THE MOSAIC THEORY OF SEIZURE 
This final Part addresses a possible objection to the two-tiered approach 
to digital search, and in doing so, draws attention to a way in which the 
Supreme Court in its recent digital search jurisprudence has already moved 
toward bringing digital-search doctrine more closely in line with seizure 
doctrine, as this Article proposes. 
It might be argued, against the two-tiered approach to digital search, that 
there is a natural distinction between a stop and an arrest that justifies Terry’s 
distinction between the reasonable suspicion required for the former and the 
probable cause required for the latter, while there is no natural dividing line 
 
 187 See Berman, supra note 30, at 578. 
 188 See Daphna Renan, The Fourth Amendment as Administrative Governance, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1039, 1043–
49 & nn.24–25, 29 (2016) (collecting citations). 
 189 Cf. Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827, 1834 
(2015) (proposing that “administrative notice-and-comment rulemaking, in which public 
participation is welcomed” could provide “democratic authorization” for policing practices); Floyd 
v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668, 671–72 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (ordering broad equitable relief, 
including “Joint Remedial Process for Developing Supplemental Reforms” with a “community 
input component”). 
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in digital search that could justify a similar distinction.  Thus, the critique 
would suggest, requiring reasonable suspicion for some digital searches and 
probable cause for others would be inevitably arbitrary and unjustifiable in 
a way that has no precedent even in the law of seizure. 
In fact, a similar critique has already been offered of the Supreme Court’s 
recent decisions in Jones and Carpenter, where the Court implicitly endorsed a 
“mosaic theory” of digital search.190  According to this theory, the line 
between a digital search and a non-search may in some contexts be based on 
how much data the government collects about an individual.191  David Gray 
and Danielle Citron have written that “[a]ccording to critics and supporters 
alike, this quantitative account of Fourth Amendment privacy is 
revolutionary.”192 
This Part will argue, by contrast, that the mosaic theory may not be as 
revolutionary of a development in Fourth Amendment doctrine as it seems.  
In fact, for decades before the Court began drawing lines between digital 
searches and non-searches based on the mosaic theory, courts used a 
functionally identical form of aggregative reasoning to draw the line between 
a seizure of a person and a non-seizure.  The application of the mosaic theory 
to digital search can thus be seen as an example of the Court applying 
doctrinal structures from the Fourth Amendment law governing the seizure 
of persons to contemporary problems in Fourth Amendment digital search.  
In other words, the mosaic theory shows that the Supreme Court has already 
taken a first step on the general methodological path that this Article 
recommends. 
What is the mosaic theory of digital search, and how is it similar to 
decades-old doctrines governing the seizure of persons? 
Orin Kerr’s “The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment” is probably 
the most frequently cited work of scholarship on the mosaic theory of search, 
 
 190 See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012); Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018); 
Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 313 (2012) (noting 
that “concurring opinions signed or joined by five of the justices” in Jones “endorsed some form of 
the . . . mosaic theory”); Orin S. Kerr, When Does a Carpenter Search Start—And When Does It Stop?, 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 6, 2018, 3:34 PM), https://reason.com/2018/07/06/when-does-a-
carpenter-search-start-and-w/ (“Carpenter seems to have adopted the basic mosaic approach of the 
Jones concurrences.”).  But cf. KERR, supra note 22, at 39 (arguing that “Carpenter leaves the future of 
the mosaic theory open”). 
 191 See supra note 190. 
 192 Gray & Citron, supra note 21, at 68. 
 
1060 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 22:4 
   
 
and is one of the foundational scholarly works focusing on aggregation as a 
central issue in the judicial response to digital surveillance under the Fourth 
Amendment.193  Kerr’s article begins with an analysis of the reasoning in 
United States v. Maynard,194 the D.C. Circuit case that became the Supreme 
Court case United States v. Jones.195  In Maynard, the D.C. Circuit held that a 
GPS tracking device attached to a vehicle twenty-four hours a day for twenty-
eight days constituted a Fourth Amendment “search,” even though the 
monitoring of a “single journey” would not have been.196  Writing for the  
court, Judge Douglas Ginsburg distinguished the Supreme Court’s 1983 
decision in United States v. Knotts, 
in which the Supreme Court held the use of a beeper device to aid in tracking 
a suspect to his drug lab was not a search . . . . [because] “[a] person traveling 
in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in his movements from one place to another.”197 
Judge Ginsburg reasoned that “unlike one’s movements during a single 
journey, the whole of one’s movements over the course of a month” is neither 
actually nor constructively “exposed to the public because the likelihood 
anyone will observe all those movements is effectively nil,” and because “that 
whole reveals more—sometimes a great deal more—than does the sum of its 
parts.”198  As in a mosaic, the whole may present a picture that the individual 
 
 193 See Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, supra note 190. 
 194 United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Jones, 565 
U.S. 400 (2012). 
 195 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012), aff’g sub nom. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544. 
 196 Maynard, 615 F.3d at 555, 565. 
 197 Id. at 555–56 (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983)).  Judge Ginsburg also 
writes:  
[I]n Knotts the Court . . . reserved the issue of prolonged surveillance.  That issue is squarely 
presented in this case.  Here the police used the GPS device not to track Jones’s 
“movements from one place to another,” Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281, but rather to track Jones’s 
movements 24 hours a day for 28 days as he moved among scores of places, thereby 
discovering the totality and pattern of his movements from place to place to place. 
  Id. at 558. 
 198 Id. at 558.  Judge Ginsburg also used the term “mosaic theory” in his opinion in Maynard, writing: 
As with the “mosaic theory” often invoked by the Government in cases involving national 
security information, “What may seem trivial to the uninformed, may appear of great 
moment to one who has a broad view of the scene.” Prolonged surveillance reveals types 
of information not revealed by short-term surveillance, such as what a person does 
repeatedly, what he does not do, and what he does ensemble.  These types of information 
can each reveal more about a person than does any individual trip viewed in isolation. 
  Id. at 562 (internal citation omitted).  On the mosaic theory in Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 
national security law, see generally David E. Pozen, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the Freedom 
of Information Act, 115 YALE L.J. 628 (2005). 
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pieces of the mosaic would not reveal if someone viewed each of the 
individual pieces in isolation.  The difference between surveillance of an 
individual trip and “prolonged” surveillance “is not one of degree but of kind, 
for no single journey reveals the habits and patterns that mark the distinction 
between a day in the life and a way of life.”199 
In other words, quantity can pass over into quality: a sufficient quantity 
of surveillance can change the legal quality of that surveillance from a non-
search to a search under the Fourth Amendment.  The result is achieved 
through aggregation.  By choosing to analyze the twenty-eight days of 
surveillance in the aggregate, the D.C. Circuit arrived at a different 
conclusion than it would have reached under Knotts if it had treated each of 
the surveilled trips during the twenty-eight days as an individual, isolated act.  
Aggregation has apparently transformed a series of non-searches into a 
single, continuous search extending over nearly a month. 
After the Supreme Court upheld the outcome of Maynard in United States 
v. Jones,200 Kerr noted that “concurring opinions signed or joined by five of 
the justices [in Jones] endorsed some form of the D.C. Circuit’s mosaic 
theory.”201  He went on to present the mosaic theory as “a major departure 
from the traditional mode of Fourth Amendment analysis,” precisely because 
of its use of aggregation: 
The current structure of Fourth Amendment doctrine hinges on what I call 
a “sequential approach.”  The sequential approach takes a snapshot of each 
discrete step and assesses whether that discrete step at that discrete time 
constitutes a search.  This analytical method forms the foundation of existing 
Fourth Amendment doctrine, ranging from the threshold question of what 
the Fourth Amendment regulates to considerations of constitutional 
reasonableness and remedies.  By aggregating conduct rather than looking 
to discrete steps, the mosaic theory offers a fundamental challenge to current 
Fourth Amendment law.202 
In stark contrast to the sequential approach, the mosaic theory asks 
“whether a series of acts that are not searches in isolation amount to a search 
 
 199 Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562. 
 200 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
 201 Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, supra note 190, at 313.  Accord Carpenter v. United 
States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2215 (2018) (internal citation omitted) (noting that, in Jones, “the concurring 
Justices concluded that ‘longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on 
expectations of privacy’—regardless whether those movements were disclosed to the public at 
large”). 
 202 Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, supra note 190, at 314. 
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when considered as a group.”203  “The mosaic theory is therefore premised 
on aggregation: it considers whether a set of nonsearches aggregated together 
amount to a search because their collection and subsequent analysis creates 
a revealing mosaic.”204  Kerr contrasts this aggregative analysis with the 
traditional, sequential approach in which, he says, the “existence and 
duration” of a search or seizure “are clear as they occur . . . and do not 
require the ex post aggregation and analysis of non-searches.”205  As an 
example of the sequential approach, Kerr summarizes the analysis in Terry: 
If an officer sees suspects preparing for a robbery, stops them, and pats them 
down for weapons, the court will consider the viewing, the stopping, and the 
patting down as distinct acts that must be analyzed separately.  Each step 
counts as its own Fourth Amendment event and is evaluated independently of 
the others.206 
Kerr’s presentation of the mosaic theory as a controversial departure 
from traditional Fourth Amendment analysis has been influential, even 
among those who, unlike him, believe that the use of the mosaic theory is a 
good idea.207  But is there in fact such a categorical distinction between the 
kind of analysis that appears in Terry and the kind that appears in “mosaic 
theory” decisions such as Maynard and, arguably, Carpenter?208 
Kerr’s argument seems to assume that there is a natural way of drawing 
the spatio-temporal lines around certain “acts,” at least for Fourth 
 
 203 Id. at 320. 
 204 Id. at 320. 
 205 Id. at 318 n.41. 
 206 Id. at 316 (emphasis added) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 18 n.15, 27–30 (1968)).  Kerr also 
writes “[T]he issue of what counts as a seizure is comparatively simple, and it therefore has received 
little scholarly attention.  Seizures require governmental assertion of control, so a seizure of property 
occurs when the government meaningfully interferes with a person’s possessory interest.”  Id. at 312 
n.2 (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)). 
 207 See Gray & Citron, supra note 21, at 68 (citing Kerr, infra); Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth 
Amendment, supra note 190, at 343–53 (criticizing the mosaic theory).  It is difficult to avoid the sense 
that hostility to the mosaic theory has something to do with a more general preference for bright-
line, formalistic rules as opposed to less mechanically applicable standards.  Fittingly, Justice Scalia, 
a devotee of rules over standards, tended like Kerr to emphasize an approach to the definition of 
search based on clear, synchronic, spatially defined boundaries, as when he wrote in Kyllo v. United 
States: “The Fourth Amendment’s protection of the home has never been tied to measurement of 
the quality or quantity of information obtained.” 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001); cf. Antonin Scalia, The 
Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179 (1989) (explaining an “advantage of 
establishing as soon as possible a clear, general principle of decision” as “predictability”). 
 208 See Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, supra note 190. 
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Amendment purposes.  Certain acts are “clear as they occur.”209  We all just 
know when a police officer is viewing a suspect, stopping her, or frisking her, 
and when each of these distinct acts begins and ends.  In Kerr’s presentation, 
the usual transactions dealt with in Fourth Amendment analysis, such as the 
search of a home or a car, or a seizure of a person during an arrest, seem to 
exist within naturally occurring frames.210  The innovation of the mosaic 
theory, Kerr suggests, is to take a series of these naturally distinct acts and to 
aggregate them for the purpose of determining whether they collectively 
constitute something qualitatively different. 
But there is no obvious reason to view a Terry stop as a single act, while 
viewing the continuous surveillance of a vehicle for twenty-eight days as a 
series of discrete acts.  In fact, it seems more in line with ordinary linguistic 
usage to describe the latter surveillance as a single act than to treat it as a 
series of acts.  If the government places a GPS tracking device on a vehicle, 
and the device remains active for twenty-eight days,211 it would arguably 
strain ordinary usage to divide the period of surveillance into some number 
of segments and call each of these segments a discrete act, even though no 
new government action takes place at the division between the segments.  Is 
it natural or obvious that the surveillance in Jones should be viewed as a series 
of legally distinct “non-searches”?  Where do the temporal lines between 
these non-searches fall?  Perhaps the mosaic theory assumes, based on Knotts, 
that each “trip” taken by the surveilled vehicle should be treated as its own 
distinct non-search.  But is this more natural than viewing the entire twenty-
eight-day surveillance as a single act that at some point crosses the threshold 
into a search? 
Conversely, to determine whether a Terry stop has taken place, it is often 
necessary to aggregate a series of acts (or what might be described as distinct 
 
 209 Id. at 318 n.41. 
 210 Cf. Levinson, supra note 56, at 1313–14 (suggesting that “the ‘frames’ that define constitutional law 
transactions” are constructed, rather than cutting along “natural joints”); RICHARD RORTY, Texts 
and Lumps, in 1 PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS: OBJECTIVITY, RELATIVISM, AND TRUTH 78, 80 (1991) 
(suggesting that “[t]he notion that some one among the languages mankind has used to deal with 
the universe is the one the universe prefers—the one which cuts things at the joints . . . . has become 
too shopworn to serve any purpose”).  This Article, like Levinson’s Framing Transactions, attempts to 
draw attention to the ways in which legal transactions, such as a “seizure” or a “Terry stop,” can be 
seen as historical (and political) constructions, rather than fixed and natural features of the 
landscape. 
 211 Cf. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 403 (2012).  In fact, the government replaced the battery 
in Jones’s vehicle once during the twenty-eight-day surveillance period. Id. 
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acts) by a police officer or officers and then to decide whether the acts, as a 
whole, would have left a reasonable person feeling that she was not “free to 
leave,” or, more abstractly, “free to terminate the encounter.”212  The 
Supreme Court’s 1991 decision in Florida v. Bostick directs courts to look to 
“whether, taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the 
encounter, the police conduct would ‘have communicated to a reasonable 
person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about 
his business.’”213  In more abstract terms, we might interpret Bostick as 
requiring courts to conduct a “totality of the circumstances” analysis 
involving the aggregation of the coercive and permissive signals 
communicated by the police’s conduct in light of the surrounding 
circumstances, where coercive signals increase and permissive signals 
decrease the sum total of coercion in the encounter.  At some point along a 
continuum, the resulting “quantity” of coercion becomes high enough that a 
reasonable person would not feel free to terminate the encounter.  At that 
point, the legal “quality” of the encounter changes from a non-seizure to a 
seizure, specifically a Terry stop. 
In practice, courts attempting to determine whether a police encounter 
rose to the level of a Terry stop often conduct precisely this sort of analysis.  
They describe various facts about the encounter that would tend to be 
relevant to a reasonable person214 attempting to decide whether he or she is 
 
 212 The “free to leave” test originated in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 554 (1980), and was 
adopted by a majority of the Court in Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502, 514 (1983).  The “free to 
terminate the encounter” test comes from Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436 (1991).  See LAFAVE, 
supra note 68, § 9.4(a). 
 213 Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437 (quoting Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 569 (1988)). 
 214 More precisely, “the ‘reasonable person’ test presupposes an innocent person.”  Bostick, 501 U.S. at 
438.  Or perhaps even more precisely, the test may presuppose an innocent adult who is white.  See 
LAFAVE, supra note 68, § 9.4(a) n.42 (quoting Maclin, supra note 81, at 250) (noting, among other 
scholarship and cases, Tracey Maclin’s proposal that “[w]hen assessing the coercive nature of an 
encounter, the Court should consider the race of the person confronted by the police, and how that 
person’s race might have influenced his attitude toward the encounter”).  Surely there can be even 
less doubt in 2020 than in 1991 that young African American men, in particular, face police with 
a very different set of reasonable assumptions than many other demographic groups.  See, e.g., Jemar 
Tisby, The Heavy Burden of Teaching My Son About American Racism, ATLANTIC, Mar. 20, 2018 (“Every 
black parent has to have ‘the talk,’ about how to survive an encounter with the police.”). 
  [Author’s Note: This Article was largely written in spring 2019 and revised in December 2019.  During 
the final copyediting of the Article, mass protests erupted in the United States in response to the 
digitally filmed killing of an African-American man, George Floyd, by a Minneapolis police officer. 
See Amy Harmon & Sabrina Tavernise, One Big Difference About George Floyd Protests: Many White Faces, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2020), https://nyti.ms/3dYnkZJ.  The protests suggest a growing public 
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free to leave.  LaFave provides a survey of some of the recurring facts courts 
have considered relevant: 
[A]n officer has not made a seizure if, for example, he interrogated “in a 
conversational manner,” “did not order the defendant” to do something or 
“demand that he” do it, did not ask questions “overbearing or harassing in 
nature,” and did not “make any threats or draw a weapon.”  As for “an 
officer’s asking for identification,” such action “alone does not amount to a 
seizure under the Fourth Amendment.”  (On the other hand, “repeated 
questioning” regarding identification, “especially when combined with . . . 
computer databases searches, would convey to a reasonable person that the 
police were unsatisfied with his answers—to the point that he would not be 
free to leave until the computer database returned a positive result.”) . . . 
[A]n encounter becomes a seizure if the officer engages in . . . . such tactics 
as pursuing a person who has attempted to terminate the contact by 
departing, continuing to interrogate a person who has clearly expressed a 
desire not to cooperate, renewing an encounter with a person who earlier 
responded fully to police inquiries, calling to such a person to halt, holding 
a person’s identification papers or other property, conducting a consensual 
search of the person in an “authoritative manner,” bringing a drug-sniffing 
dog toward the person or his property, intercepting a phone call for the 
suspect, blocking the path of the suspect, physically grabbing and moving 
the suspect, drawing a weapon, calling for backup, and encircling the suspect 
by many officers, in addition to the more obvious ones.215 
In other words, it would be difficult to defend the notion that a “stop” by 
a police officer is a single, naturally delineated act, as Kerr’s presentation of 
the mosaic theory assumes.  To the contrary, a Terry stop is a legal 
construction that is often defined through the aggregation of multiple acts 
taking place over time, like a Maynard/Jones-type search as presented by Kerr.  
Just as the court in Maynard aggregated a number of acts that were not 
searches into a search, so courts attempting to determine whether a Terry stop 
has taken place routinely aggregate a number of acts that were not seizures 
into a seizure.  Something similar could be said of other legal categories and 
definitions in the Fourth Amendment doctrine governing the seizure of 
 
acceptance of the racial critiques of American policing and criminal procedure that scholars such 
as Maclin have been making for decades.  Other than this footnote, however, I have not revised 
the Article to address developments since December 2019, including the COVID-19 pandemic. 
The pandemic, and the technological reactions to it, have obviously demonstrated the urgency of 
developing constitutionally reasonable restrictions on digital mass surveillance in the United States.] 
 215 LAFAVE, supra note 68, § 9.4(a) (citations omitted). 
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persons, including the definition of various types of arrest and the definition 
of consent to stop.216  
If a Terry stop seems to many of us today to be a naturally discrete act, 
while prolonged location-tracking using a GPS device seems to consist of a 
series of separate acts—at least for those attuned to the reasoning of Knotts—
this may in large part be an illusion resulting from the fact that we have 
become habituated to Terry stops as a legal category, while the coalescing of 
prolonged electronic surveillance as a recognizable legal category is far more 
recent and unsettled.  In fact, if Jones had established a bright-line rule that 
continuous GPS surveillance of a vehicle for up to seven days is a non-search, 
while the continuation of the surveillance after the start of day seven is a 
search and requires a warrant,217 it would be easy to imagine courts in the 
future referring to a “Jones search” just as they refer to a “Terry stop” today.  
In time, it might have come to seem intuitive to think of Jones searches—
continuous digital location tracking of vehicles lasting seven days or longer—
as discrete, naturally defined acts, rather than as artificial aggregations of 
smaller acts.  As often happens with legal categories, and with concepts in 
general, the process of construction that resulted in the intuitive sense of a 
stable entity would have gradually faded from view. 
 
 216 Cf. Id. § 5.1(a) (quoting United States v. Corral-Franco, 848 F.2d 536 (5th Cir. 1988) (defining an 
arrest as a seizure in which “a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would have understood 
the situation to constitute a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree which the law associates 
with formal arrest”)).  Similarly, LaFave notes that courts determine whether a consent to be seized 
was “voluntary” by looking to the “totality of the circumstances,” potentially including:  
the time, place and purpose of the encounter; the words used by the officer, his tone of 
voice and general demeanor in requesting the defendant to accompany him to the police 
station; the officer’s statements to others who were present during the encounter; the 
manner in which the defendant was escorted out of the house and transported to the 
stationhouse; the officer’s response to any questions by the defendant or his parents 
regarding the defendant’s right to refuse to go to the stationhouse; and the defendant’s 
verbal or non-verbal responses to any directions given to him by the officer. 
  Id. § 5.1 & nn.22–50 (quoting People v. Pancoast, 659 P.2d 1348 (Colo. 1982)).  
 217 Because Justice Scalia’s opinion for the majority in Jones was based on a theory of trespass, it did 
not address the issue of how long, under a mosaic theory, the GPS tracking would have had to be 
in order to constitute a Fourth Amendment search.  See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–
411 (2012).  Justice Alito noted, however, in a concurrence joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and 
Kagan, that “[w]e need not identify with precision the point at which the tracking of this vehicle 
became a search, for the line was surely crossed before the 4-week mark.” Id. at 418, 430 (Alito, J., 
concurring in the judgment).  Based on the holding in Carpenter v. United States that “accessing seven 
days of CSLI constitutes a Fourth Amendment search,” 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 n.3 (2018), it does 
not seem implausible that future courts might also hold that the collection of digital location 
tracking data for a vehicle for seven days or longer constitutes a Fourth Amendment search.  For 
the possible treatment of digital location tracking lasting less than seven days, see Part III.B above. 
 
June 2020] MASS SEIZURE AND MASS SEARCH 1067 
   
 
Similarly, the application of various evidentiary standards under the 
Fourth Amendment such as “reasonable suspicion” or “probable cause” 
frequently involves the aggregation of multiple acts over time—in those 
cases, the acts of the suspect.218  Reasonable suspicion analysis often involves 
the aggregation of a number of pieces of evidence that would not provide a 
basis for reasonable suspicion by themselves into a totality of evidence that 
does provide such a basis.219  The Supreme Court has even referred to such 
an aggregation using the mosaic-like metaphor of “the whole picture”: 
Terms like “articulable reasons” and “founded suspicion” are not self-
defining . . . .  But the essence of all that has been written is that the totality 
of the circumstances—the whole picture—must be taken into account.  
Based upon that whole picture the detaining officers must have a 
particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person 
stopped of criminal activity.220  
In the words of the Court in Terry, police officers may observe “a series of 
acts, each of them perhaps innocent in itself, but which taken together 
warrant[ ] further investigation.”221  Or as the Second Circuit has stated, “the 
proper inquiry is not whether each fact considered in isolation denotes 
unlawful behavior, but whether all the facts taken together support a 
reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing.”222  Just as it is necessary to view the 
pieces of a mosaic together in order to perceive a picture, so it is often 
necessary in reasonable suspicion analysis to view a series of acts in 
combination in order to perceive the grounds for suspicion.  
To be clear, Kerr’s argument is that the mosaic theory has not been used 
until recently to distinguish between conduct governed by the Fourth 
Amendment, and conduct that is not—and his primary focus is the 
distinction between a non-search and a search.  He says nothing about the 
use of aggregative reasoning in the analysis of reasonable suspicion or 
probable cause.  But the fact that mosaic-like reasoning also appears in the 
context of the application of evidentiary standards adds to the sense that the 
Court’s recent invocation of such reasoning in digital search cases did not 
 
 218 See generally LAFAVE, supra note 68, §§ 3.1–7, 9.5. 
 219 See LAFAVE, supra note 68, § 9.5(b) (“The essential point, the Sokolow Court said (quoting Terry), is 
that “a series of acts, each of them perhaps innocent” if viewed separately, sometimes “warranted 
further investigation” when taken together.”). 
 220 United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18 (1981).  
 221 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968). 
 222 United States v. Lee, 916 F.2d 814, 820 (2d Cir. 1990). 
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represent a radical departure within Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  
With regard to both the definition of stops (and, for that matter, arrests), and 
the definition of reasonable suspicion (and, for that matter, probable cause), 
Fourth Amendment doctrine has long recognized that a series of acts that do 
not fit a legal category in isolation may fit the category “when considered as 
a group.”223  Even if it is true that courts have not applied this type of 
aggregative analysis until recently to the specific question of what rises to the 
level of a search, the use of such an analysis in other core areas of Fourth 
Amendment law suggests that it is neither as much of a methodological 
innovation nor as problematic as recent scholarship may suggest. 
CONCLUSION 
A sophisticated observer of the role that the Supreme Court and its 
interpretations of constitutional law have played in American history might 
object that the focus of this Article on Fourth Amendment doctrine is 
misplaced.  If Americans are willing to surround themselves with digital 
sensors whose data may ultimately be transmitted to the government for 
storage, analysis, and querying, the argument would go, it is hopeless to 
expect courts to stop the gradual slide toward an ever-more intrusive and 
oppressive digital surveillance state.224  
After all, it might be argued, the Supreme Court rarely departs too far 
from popular preferences; it has been especially ineffective as a check on 
executive power wielded in the name of national security; and its current 
composition suggests that future displays of countermajoritarianism will 
likely be in favor of, rather than against, law enforcement, executive power, 
and national security interests.  It was always misguided for progressives and 
civil libertarians to dedicate so much energy and attention to the project of 
attempting to win the votes of largely unsympathetic swing Justices over the 
last four decades.  Now that the Court has been stocked with youthful, 
conservative appointees, the argument might conclude, it is almost laughable 
 
 223 Cf. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, supra note 190, at 320. 
 224 In the frequently quoted words of Learned Hand: “I often wonder whether we do not rest our hopes 
too much upon constitutions, upon laws and upon courts.  These are false hopes . . . . Liberty lies 
in the hearts of men and women; when it dies there, no constitution, no law, no court can save it 
. . . .” LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY: PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF LEARNED HAND 
189–90 (Irving Dillard ed., 1952). 
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for progressives and civil libertarians to maintain hope for salvation through 
the Supreme Court.225  
Indeed, a strong case could be made that the greatest and most urgent 
threats in the contemporary United States to the privacy values enshrined in 
the Fourth Amendment lie categorically outside the reach of Fourth 
Amendment doctrine.226  Privacy is likely more threatened by the abuses of 
private parties, from social media platforms and credit card companies to 
Internet and cell phone service providers, than by state action.227  Unless and 
until the Supreme Court begins carving out limitations to the state action 
doctrine, attempts to regulate the privacy practices of private businesses 
through legislation, administrative action, and democratic activism will 
almost certainly remain the most important fronts in the struggle for privacy 
in the digital age. 
But even if the preceding critiques show that the reform of Fourth 
Amendment doctrine should not be the primary focus of efforts to defend 
digital privacy, the critiques do not suggest that the shape of Fourth 
Amendment doctrine makes no difference at all.  Government invasions of 
privacy obviously continue to have a special importance because of the 
powers of government, including through the punitive enforcement of 
criminal laws.  In closing, I would emphasize three reasons why those who 
are concerned about digital privacy should remain engaged in debates over 
the future shape of Fourth Amendment digital search doctrine. 
First, and most importantly, whatever the relative efficacy of protecting 
digital privacy through courts and other means, it remains the fact that 
judges will continue to be confronted with litigants challenging the 
 
 225 Cf. Samuel Moyn, Resisting the Juristocracy, BOSTON REV. (Oct. 5, 2018), 
http://bostonreview.net/law-justice/samuel-moyn-resisting-juristocracy (criticizing the inevitable 
prospect that many progressives “will look hopefully to Chief Justice John Roberts as the new swing 
vote and treat him, as they did Anthony Kennedy, as the new ‘centrist’ to lure”). 
 226 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1, 19–21 
(2008). 
 227 An example that arose during the writing of this Article, one of countless examples that could be 
offered, involves medical information: “[P]owerful companies such as LexisNexis have begun 
hoovering up the data from insurance claims, digital health records, housing records, and even 
information about a patient’s friends, family and roommates, without telling the patient they are 
accessing the information, and creating risk scores for health care providers and insurers.” Mohana 
Ravindranath, How Your Health Information Is Sold and Turned into ‘Risk Scores,’ POLITICO (Feb. 3, 2019, 
6:56 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/02/03/health-risk-scores-opioid-abuse-
1139978.  
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constitutionality under the Fourth Amendment of the government’s 
collection and use of digital data.  These judges will be forced to make rulings.  
As appealing as counterintuitive arguments based on futility, perversity, and 
jeopardy may be in an academic setting, it is hardly the case that when courts 
hold a practice to be an unconstitutional violation of some constitutional 
right, the result is always a political backlash that ultimately leads to greater 
violations of the right or the sacrifice of some other interest.  
To the contrary, as the stop-and-frisk litigation in New York shows, a 
judicial declaration that a practice violates the Constitution can at least 
sometimes focus public and official attention on the practice in a way that 
ultimately undermines popular support for it and encourages the practice’s 
abandonment by public officials.228  The stop-and-frisk litigation also offers 
a reminder that not all constitutional decisions are made by the Supreme 
Court, or ever reach the Court.229  There is no reason for privacy advocates 
to unilaterally abandon the courts as one potential lever for promoting digital 
privacy—especially considering that digital privacy may be one of the only 
disputed areas on which the current Supreme Court’s remaining liberals are 
sometimes, at the moment, capable of achieving a majority.  
Second, promoting digital privacy through social movements, legislation, 
and administrative action generally requires that the public be aware of the 
government’s use of digital surveillance, so that the public can organize in 
opposition to excesses, and advocate for legislative and regulatory change.  
But much of the government’s use of digital surveillance, across all levels and 
areas of government, has been and remains clouded in secrecy.  
Constitutional litigation can sometimes help expose, document, and draw 
attention to government practices that would otherwise remain unknown.230 
 
 228 As Harmon and Manns note:  
In the presence of intense public and media debate following the Floyd decision, Bill de 
Blasio, a long-shot candidate, bet his political future on opposing the SQF policy, and won 
that bet.  After he took office, he withdrew the appeal, ending further litigation of the 
merits; agreed to the City’s participation in the court-run remedial process; and has 
substantially changed NYPD’s practices with respect to stops and frisks in New York City. 
  Harmon & Manns, supra note 64, at 68 (footnotes omitted). 
 229 See id. 
 230 See, e.g., Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 40 (D.D.C. 2013) (noting that “the Government 
does not cite a single instance in which analysis of the NSA’s bulk metadata collection actually 
stopped an imminent attack, or otherwise aided the Government in achieving any objective that 
was time-sensitive in nature”), vacated, 800 F.3d 559 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
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Third, even if some parts of the public are aware of constitutionally 
problematic digital surveillance practices, such awareness may be insufficient 
to bring about change if the most negatively affected parts of the public lack 
sufficient political power.  In the words of Justice Robert Jackson, “[c]ourts 
can take no better measure to assure that laws will be just than to require that 
laws be equal in operation.”231  Where laws are unequal in their operation, 
as policing and surveillance have been throughout American history,232 
judicial intervention may be a worthwhile, perhaps even essential, part of a 
larger, coordinated political effort to protect the privacy of marginalized 
groups from digital threats.  Although it might seem at first glance that digital 
surveillance would mostly affect the affluent, because they own and use the 
most digital devices, in reality the usual subjects of disproportionate 
government surveillance—such as racial and religious minorities, and those 
living in poverty233—are likely to bear a disproportionate burden of digital 
surveillance as well.  They will have more contacts with bodycam-wearing 
police, their neighborhoods will be the focus of anti-crime surveillance 
technologies such as surveillance cameras, stingrays, and gunfire locators, 
and their interactions with often invasive government programs will result in 
greater accumulations of government records, which may then be digitally 
stored, aggregated, and queried.  
Indeed, when this Article has referred to mass or large-scale surveillance, 
it has often left unspecified which community or communities might be 
subject to such surveillance.  But surely one of the things that makes 
unchecked digital mass surveillance so troubling is the likelihood that it will 
be focused on politically subordinated groups.  In the context of digital mass 
surveillance, as in so many other contexts, the concerns of the Fourth 
Amendment ultimately cannot be separated from the concerns of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.234  It is true that the 
judiciary may not be able, by itself, to prevent the rise of an era of 
discriminatory digital mass surveillance, if the political will for such programs 
exists.  But, if nothing else, courts can attempt to draw democratic attention 
 
 231 Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 113 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 232 See generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1993). 
 233 See, e.g., KHIARA BRIDGES, THE POVERTY OF PRIVACY RIGHTS (2017). 
 234 In a future work, I hope to explore the equal protection implications of discriminatory mass 
surveillance in greater depth. 
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to the constitutional threats posed by such programs, and can avoid 
complicity in their undermining of the Constitution.235 
 
 
 
 235 Cf. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 244 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (suggesting that 
in times when constitutional values are threatened, even if the Supreme Court cannot confine the 
executive’s expedients by the Constitution, neither should the Court “distort the Constitution to 
approve” all that the executive deems expedient), overruled by Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 
(2018); ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 
(1975). 
